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Abstract
This paper investigates the importance of network e¤ects in the demand for ethanol-compatible
vehicles and the supply of ethanol fuel retailers. An indirect network e¤ect, or positive feed-
back loop, arises in this context due to spatially-dependent complementarities in the availability
of ethanol fuel and the installed base of ethanol-compatible vehicles. Marketers and social
planners are interested in whether these e¤ects exist, and if so, how policy might accelerate
adoption of the ethanol fuel standard within a targeted population. To measure these feedback
e¤ects, I develop an econometric framework that considers the simultaneous determination of
ethanol-compatible vehicle demand and ethanol fuel supply in local markets. The demand-side
of the model considers the automobile purchase decisions of consumers and eet operators, and
the supply-side model considers the ethanol market entry decisions of competing fuel retailers.
I propose new estimators that address the endogeneity induced by the co-determination of al-
ternative fuel vehicle demand and alternative fuel supply. I estimate the model using zip code
level panel data from six states over a six year period. I nd the network e¤ect to be highly
signicant, both statistically and economically. Under typical market conditions, entry of an ad-
ditional ethanol fuel retailer leads to a 12% increase in consumer demand for ethanol-compatible
vehicles. The entry model estimates imply that a monopolist requires a local installed base of
at least 204 ethanol-compatible vehicles to be protable. As an application, I demonstrate how
the model estimates can inform the promotional strategy of a vehicle manufacturer. Counter-
factual simulations indicate that subsidizing fuel retailers to o¤er ethanol can be an e¤ective
policy to indirectly increase ethanol-compatible vehicle sales.
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The problem right now is that the supply of ethanol is not anywhere near the demand. So the
vast majority of the ethanol-capable vehicles we have on the road right now do not use ethanol
simply because people dont know where to buy it.
- Rick Wagoner, (former) General Motors Chairman
Theres a chicken-and-egg proposition here. If you dont have enough ex-fuel vehicles, theres
less incentive to make [ethanol] fuel and sell it at a retail level.
- Mark Hamerlinck, Minnesota Corn Growers Association
1 Introduction
The demand for many goods depends upon the availability of a complementary product. A canon-
ical example is that demand for computer hardware depends upon the availability of compatible
software (Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1994; Farrell and Saloner, 1985; Church and Gandal, 1992). In
these systems, fullling consumer demand for a whole product(e.g., computing services) requires
provision of both a durable good (hardware) and one or more consumption goods (software) (Moore,
1995; Gupta, Jain, and Sawhney, 1999). The interdependence of demand for complementary goods
implies that rms may face a chicken-or-egg problem when a new product is introduced (Katz and
Shapiro, 1994; Caillaud and Jullien, 2003). That is, software rms will not enter the market if
few consumers have purchased compatible hardware systems, and consumers will not purchase new
hardware unless software is readily available. Complementary product suppliers may overcome
this problem by entering joint marketing agreements that align the rmsnancial incentives and
coordinate their product distribution and promotion strategies. Agreements of this type are par-
ticularly attractive, since growth in the installed base of hardware (i.e., cumulative demand)
leads more rms to enter the market for compatible software, which in turn leads to more hardware
sales, and so on. This positive feedback cycle, or indirect network e¤ect,1 generates demand-side
economies of scale for suppliers of the complementary goods, compounding investment returns on
costs to implement the marketing policy (Nair, Chintagunta, and Dubé, 2004; Karaca-Mandic,
2004).
In this paper, I examine the role of indirect network e¤ects in the market for ethanol fuel.
Although ethanol is a common component in all blends of motor fuel (retail gasoline typically
contains up to 10% ethanol), my inquiry relates specically to E85, a standard blend containing
85% ethanol and 15% regular gasoline. E85 is classied as an alternative fuel that may only be used
in ex-fuel vehicles (FFVs), which are engineered to accept high-alcohol fuels. In this market, ex-
fuel vehicles represent the hardware side of the system, whereas locations of E85 retailers dene the
1The e¤ect is deemed indirect as consumer utility for hardware increases with greater availability of comple-
mentary software, which depends (indirectly) on the total number of consumers that have adopted the hardware
system. By contrast, a direct network e¤ect results when utility for a product increases in (direct) response to
other consumers adopting the product. Communication devices such as fax machines and cell phones are typical
examples of products that exhibit direct network e¤ects.
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availability of software. An indirect network e¤ect arises due to the fact that as more consumers and
eets2 purchase ex-fuel vehicles, more fuel retailers are likely to enter the E85 market, and vice-
versa. Unlike the more commonly studied case of complementary high tech products, where utility
for hardware depends on the distance of compatible software manufacturers from the consumers
ideal points in product feature space,utility for an alternative fuel vehicle is determined by the
physical proximity of alternative fuel distributors to the consumers physical location. Feedback
in adoption of the ethanol fuel standard3 therefore operates within highly local markets and, due
to the relative infrequency of consumer vehicle replacement, over extended periods of time. These
factors make separate identication of the network e¤ects from unobserved factors a challenging
empirical exercise. My rst objective for the study is therefore to consistently measure each side
of the feedback loop: the e¤ect of E85 availability on ex-fuel vehicle demand, and the e¤ect of
the ex-fuel vehicle installed base on the supply of E85. My second objective is to explore the
marketing policy implications of these measurements for suppliers of ex-fuel vehicles and E85 fuel.
A third objective of the paper is to develop new methods to permit inference of simultaneous supply
and demand in markets with endogenous markets sizes, such as those governed by network e¤ects.
To achieve these goals, I develop an equilibrium model of ex-fuel vehicle demand and E85
market entry. The model may be interpreted as a two-sided model of technology adoption, with
observations of ex-fuel demand or E85 market entry representing agent decisions to adopt the
ethanol fuel standard. I model ex-fuel demand as a utility-maximizing discrete choice of whether
or not to purchase an ethanol-compatible vehicle. Utility for ex-fuel is a function of the availability
of ethanol fuel, which I operationalize as the number of retail service stations o¤ering E85. E85
market entry is modeled as a competitive game of complete information played amongst potentially
entering retailers, in the spirit of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). These models infer retailer prot
functions from observations of the number of entering rms, using exogenous variation in the
market size to separately identify variable and xed cost factors. I extend the Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) framework to allow for an endogenously determined fuel retailer market size (the ex-
fuel installed base) and to exploit demand-side data to better pin down rmsprot functions.
This approach follows a recent marketing literature that demonstrates how empirical models of
product introduction may be enriched by augmenting demand-side information (e.g. Reiss and
Spiller, 1989; Draganska and Mazzeo, 2003; Ellickson and Misra, 2007; Musalem and Shin, 2009).
I estimate the model using an extraordinarily rich panel dataset, which encompasses the entire
population of ex-fuel vehicle purchase and E85 market entry events in roughly 7,000 zip codes over
the six year period 2001-2006. Access to zip code level data is critically important in my application,
2Fleet vehicles are owned and operated by corporations or government agencies, as opposed to individual con-
sumers. For example, vehicle eets are operated by rental car agencies, taxicab companies, and municipal police
departments. Due to systematic di¤erences in consumer and eet behavior, I model demand for ex-fuel vehicles
from these populations separately.
3 In the terminology of the technology standards literature (e.g. Farrell and Saloner, 1985), the 85% (15%) blend
of ethanol (gasoline) denes a standard of interoperability between the vehicle/fuel system, in the same manner
that the DVD format denes an interoperability standard for media players and titles. Since ex-fuel vehicles are
backwardly compatible with regular gasoline, FFV owners obtain an option value arising from the ability to use either
fuel standard.
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as it provides direct observation of feedback e¤ects that operate within highly localized markets.
Having repeated observations allows me to control for unobservables that are potentially correlated
with entry, by using a rich specication of market and period xed e¤ects. Additional concerns for
endogeneity may arise due to residual correlation between rmsentry decisions and market and
time-specic unobservables. I address this additional concern using tools from the econometrics
literature on panel data methods (e.g. Chamberlain, 1984; Arellano and Bond, 1991). Under the
testable assumption that past levels of E85 availability do not inuence current vehicle choices,
appropriately lagged values of the number of E85 retailers are used as additional instruments for
the current number of E85 retailers in the vehicle demand equations.
Estimation proceeds in two steps. In the rst step, I estimate the ex-fuel demand parameters
using the system GMMestimator of Blundell and Bond (1998), instrumenting for the number
of E85 retailers in the market. In the second step, I estimate the market entry model conditional
upon the rst stage demand estimates. The two-step approach claries how the estimator works
in practice. Intuitively, access to demand data along with instruments in the rst stage enables
the econometrician to consistently back-outthe distribution of demand-side shocks. Parameters
capturing the covariance of supply-side shocks with the demand shocks can then be estimated with
the entry model parameters in the second step. Given a guess of these parameters, one can simulate
market shocks and solve the reduced form of the system for the equilibrium number of E85 retailers.
By averaging outcomes from multiple draws of the market shocks, I obtain the expected number
of E85 retailers in equilibrium, given the entry and covariance parameters. Solving the reduced
form fully accounts for the co-determination of E85 market entry and ex-fuel demand, and thus
controls for the endogeneity of the ex-fuel installed base in the entry equation. Estimation of the
entry model is then based on nding the parameter vector that minimizes the di¤erence (in the
sum of squares sense) in the observed number of E85 retailers and the model-predicted equilibrium
number of rms. To correct for measurement error introduced in the second step estimation by
using rst stage parameters, I employ a nonparametric bootstrap over the two step procedure
to obtain standard errors, in which market histories are sampled with replacement. I present
several versions of the estimator that correspond to di¤erent econometric assumptions, as well as
assumptions about rmsconduct.
I nd evidence of a network e¤ect with both statistical and economic signicance. The demand
estimates suggest that, under average market conditions, entry of an additional ethanol retailer
leads to a 12.0% annual increase in consumer ex-fuel vehicle sales and a 25.6% increase in eet
ex-fuel vehicle sales. Similarly, the market entry model implies that an ethanol retailer requires
an installed base of at least 204 consumer ex-fuel vehicles to operate protably. The e¤ect of
the eet vehicle installed base on ethanol retailer market entry is weaker than for the consumer
installed base, with 7.1 eet vehicles required to match the expected ethanol fuel consumption of
one consumer ex-fuel vehicle. I nd these results are robust to a variety of assumptions, including
the competitive conduct of rms and the independence of market observations.
I use my estimates to assess three counterfactual policy scenarios. The rst counterfactual
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is a descriptive exercise, aimed at quantifying the long-run impact of the network e¤ect across a
sample of heterogeneous markets. This simulation nds that in the nal period studied, 27.5% of
the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles and 9.4% of E85 market entry events result from the network
e¤ect. The second and third policy experiments explore strategies to improve ex-fuel vehicle
manufacturer protability by harnessing the network e¤ect. Specically, I evaluate two types of
subsidies paid by vehicle manufacturers to fuel retailers to encourage E85 market entry. For the
rst type of subsidy, the vehicle manufacturer o¤ers a xed payment in each period to any fuel
retailer that o¤ers E85. For the second policy, the vehicle manufacturer selectively o¤ers subsidies
to markets in which the expected current period payo¤ is positive, i.e., prots from the incremental
number of ex-fuel vehicles sold (due to the increased E85 availability) exceeds the cost to subsidize
an additional entrant. In simulations, targeting incentive policies at the market level leads to a
50% increase in protability over a xed rate subsidy equal to 10% of E85 retailer average xed
costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss related literature and the positioning of
my study. Section 3 describes the data collected for the analysis. I develop the econometric model
in Section 4. In Section 5, I provide details of the estimation routine. Section 6 presents the main
estimation results. In Section 7, I develop and summarize the counterfactual experiments. Section
8 concludes with a summary and a discussion of future directions for research.
2 Related literature
The study contributes to several streams of research. The most central of these is the empirical
literature on indirect network e¤ects.4 Most studies of indirect network e¤ects have focused on high
technology products that conform to the standard concept of a hardware/software system advanced
by Katz and Shapiro (1985). Among the products considered by these studies are VCRs (Park
(2004), Ohashi (2003)), CD/DVD players (Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000), Basu, Mazumdar,
and Raj (2003), Karaca-Mandic (2004), Dranove and Gandal (2003)), PDAs (Nair, Chintagunta,
and Dubé (2004)), and video game consoles (Shankar and Bayus (2003), Clements and Ohashi
(2005), Liu (2006), Dubé, Hitsch, and Chintagunta (2007), Lee (2009)). Unlike these studies,
I investigate network e¤ects that operate at a local, rather than industry, level. Whereas the
availability of ethanol fuel is determined by the physical location of retail E85 outlets, the relevant
measure of software availability in these industries is the variety of software titles available, since
the proliferation of retail and online outlets for these goods makes them essentially ubiquitous
once released. As a consequence, most of these papers use industry aggregate time series data
4The network e¤ects literature has its theoretical foundations in the works of Katz and Shapiro (1985), Katz and
Shapiro (1986), Farrell and Saloner (1986) and Farrell and Saloner (1985). These papers formalize the concept of
network e¤ects as positive consumption externalities and explore the role of standards compatibility in technology
adoption. Chou and Shy (1990), Church and Gandal (1992), Church and Gandal (1993), and Katz and Shapiro
(1992) develop theoretical models of indirect network e¤ects that arise through product complementary.
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to identify the network e¤ect. By contrast, my study exploits rich panel data for identication of
highly localized feedback loops.
Empirical research of indirect network e¤ects arising from spatially-dependent product com-
plementarities has been less common. The literature on shopping malls examines retail demand
externalities that arise when consumers are drawn to shopping centers to reduce their search costs
for a variety of goods (e.g. Eppli and Benjamin (1994), Vitorino (2007)). The focus of these papers
is to infer the benets of agglomeration in retail outlets to the mall operators, store owners, and
consumers. The motor fuel category I study is conceptually distinct from these works, however, as
the key benet to consumers is not the concentrated availability of many goods, but the distributed
access to one type of good. Rysman (2004) investigates indirect network e¤ects in the market for
Yellow Pages directories, which have spatial complementarities by nature of their circulation areas.
As in my study, Rysman (2004) measures both sides of a feedback loop, which in his context
operates between the supply of advertisements in a directory and consumer use of the directory.
However, Rysman (2004) does not explicitly consider rm market entry decisions, focusing instead
on the role of network e¤ects and competition among incumbent rms. More closely related to
my model is that of Berry and Waldfogel (1999), who investigate the welfare implications of entry
in radio broadcasting. The Berry and Waldfogel (1999) model measures the market expanding
e¤ects of station entry on the total number of radio listeners in a metro area. A limitation of the
Berry and Waldfogel (1999) model is that it requires auxiliary data in order to estimate parameters
that shift variable components of rm prots. My model is more suitable to contexts where both
xed and variable components of prot must be inferred solely from observations of market entry.
From a policy perspective, the study adds to the burgeoning literature on the economics of
ethanol as a transportation fuel in the United States. Two recent studies include Anderson (2006),
who estimates demand for E85 and nds strong evidence of fuel-switching behavior among ex-fuel
vehicle owners, and Anderson and Sallee (2009) who present evidence that domestic automakers
produce ex-fuel vehicles primarily as a means to lower the cost of complying with federal fuel-
economy (CAFE) standards.5 In a closely related paper, Corts (2010) investigates the inuence
of government eet adoption on E85 market entry. Corts (2010) presents descriptive regressions
of the number of rms on the installed bases of government eet ex-fuel vehicles and consumer
ex-fuel vehicles. Both studies nd positive e¤ects of the ex-fuel installed base on the number of
E85 retailers, but di¤er in the estimates of the number of ex-fuel vehicles required to support an
E85 retailer. These di¤erences appear to originate in the datasets, which have similar geographic
coverage but di¤er in time and format (Corts (2010) uses a cross-section). I compare the results in
greater detail when presenting my results in Section 6.1.
5Vehicle manufacturers are granted generous CAFE credits for producing alternative fuel vehicles, including ex-
fuel, o¤setting lower fuel economy in the remainder of their product line.
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3 Industry background and data
3.1 Flex-fuel vehicles
The Ford Model T, the rst vehicle to be mass produced on an assembly line, could use blends of
ethanol and gasoline in arbitrary proportion, similar to the ex-fuel vehicles of today. Through-
out the early 20th century, service stations commonly o¤ered blends dominated by each fuel type.
However, by the 1930s gasoline became the de facto standard transportation fuel through declines
in production cost, and ethanol compatibility was phased out of vehicle designs. Ethanols resur-
gence in recent years has been spurred by a series of public policy interventions. The major policy
instrument a¤ecting the production of ethanol-compatible vehicles is the federal Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard. Enacted in the wake of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, CAFE
standards require vehicle manufacturers to maintain an overall fuel e¢ ciency rating for the eet
of vehicles they supply. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) of 1988 granted vehicle manu-
facturers generous CAFE credits for the production of alternative fuel vehicles (AFVs), including
those capable of utilizing ethanol. E85/gasoline ex-fuel vehicles have since become the dominant
means by which manufacturers have captured AFV CAFE credits, representing 90% of all alter-
native fuel vehicles supplied from 1998 to 2006.6 The cost of modifying an existing gasoline-only
model to accept E85 is estimated at $50-$100 per vehicle,7 implying production of E85 ex-fuel ve-
hicles is an e¤ective means to comply with the CAFE regulation (see Anderson and Sallee (2009)).
Manufacturers tend to supply ex-fuel versions of their top selling models by category (pickup,
sedan, SUV, and van) and typically do not mark up the ex-fuel capability. The two versions of
the vehicle function identically except with respect to fuel economy. Flex-fuel vehicles running on
E85 typically get about 25-30% lower fuel economy than when running on gasoline. The lower fuel
economy is a consequence of ethanols lower energy density than gasoline.
3.2 E85 Fuel
Although retail service station adoption of E85 has grown rapidly since 2005, the overall penetration
of the retail fuel market remains quite small. As of September 2007, fewer than 1200 of the nations
135,000 service stations o¤ered E85. In order to sell E85, fuel retailers must frequently install new
or upgrade existing dispensing infrastructure to accommodate E85s handling requirements. The
corrosive and water-absorbing properties of alcohol require that E85 be stored in specially lined
tanks dedicated for E85 use. Specialty hoses, nozzles, and handles are also required. Some
existing tanks may be retrotted for E85 use; otherwise, a new storage tank will be required for
the station to o¤er E85. The Department of Energy estimates installation costs can range from
$5,000 to more than $60,000, depending on the conguration required.8 However, E85 refueling
6Source: http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/vehicles.html
7Source: Union of concerned scientists website, http://www.ucsusa.org.
8Available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/ethanol/cost.html
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infrastructure has been the target of several incentive programs, both state and federal. Most
notably, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05) provides for reimbursement of up to 30% of the
costs to install E85 compliant tanks and dispensing pumps (up to $30,000). Thus, the xed costs
of entering the E85 market are to a large degree o¤set by available subsidies. Further, with minor
modications, E85-compliant storage tanks can generally be used to handle gasoline, implying that
storage tank costs are not fully sunk, since the station may subsequently reallocate the tank to
a gasoline product. Since service stations typically maintain a limited number of storage tanks
(which can service multiple pumps), and only one blended product may be allocated to each tank,
a major component of the cost of carrying E85 is the opportunity cost of using the tank to sell
another product.9 This opportunity cost is e¤ectively a recurring xed cost.
Commerical production of bulk ethanol as well as retail sales of E85 are concentrated in the
Midwest. The relative abundance of ethanol in this region may be explained by the proximity to
large amounts of corn, the primary feedstock for ethanol in the U.S., which results in low trans-
portation costs for the feedstock and processed liquid fuel. Minnesota, which has long maintained
pro-ethanol policies, has consistently led the nation in the number of public E85 outlets, with ap-
proximately 300 service stations (12% of the state total) online as of March 2007. In spite of the
relative availability of E85 in Minnesota, it comprises a small fraction of overall fuel sales in the
state. Among stations that sell E85, the average reported monthly volume from 2001-2007 was ap-
proximately 2200 gallons, about 3% of the average station volume for gasoline.10 Anderson (2006)
studies the demand for E85 in Minnesota, and nds evidence that consumers are willing to pay
a small premium for E85, presumably due to perceptions about ethanols environmental benets
relative to gasoline or preferences for a domestically produced motor fuel. He also documents
evidence of fuel-switching behavior by ex-fuel vehicle owners.
3.3 Data
Data for the study are a panel of six yearly observations of 6882 Census zip code tabulation
areas11 from the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Texas, and California. The data span
the years 2001 to 2006. Vehicle sales data comes from R.L. Polk & Company, which compiles
vehicle registration information from state departments of motor vehicles. The records provided
9 In a technical report from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory that analyzes the business case for selling
E85, Johnson and Melendez (2007) state: Gasoline stations in the United States have an estimated average of 3.3
underground storage tanks (USTs) each (Miller 2007). This average includes regular gasoline, premium, mid-grade,
diesel (which tend to be concentrated at large truck stops), and kerosene. Stations often dedicate two of these tanks
to regular unleaded (Kaiser 2007) and one to premium.
10Source: Minnesota Department of Commerce website, http://www.state.mn.us/portal/mn/jsp/home.do?agency=Commerce
11Henceforth, zip code is taken to mean a Census 2000 Zip Code Tabulation Area (ZCTA). Zip codes, which
represent mail delivery routes, can overlap in space and are therefore unsuitable for dening unique spatial regions.
ZCTAs created by the Census solve this issue by mapping overlapping zip codes to a single spatial region. Data
from the Census is reported directly by ZCTA whereas other sources use postal zip codes. A 1999 vintage crosswalk
le is available that maps postal zip codes to ZCTAs. To map newer postal zip codes to ZCTAs, I rst obtained the
zip code latitude and longitude coordinates from a public geocoding service. Next, using shapeles containing the
coordinates of ZCTA boundaries, I assigned the zip code to a ZCTA using a point-in-polygon routine.
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are transaction level, and represent the complete population of ex-fuel vehicle registrations for
the period of study. Record attributes include the vehicles zip code of registration, date of
registration and registrant type (consumer or eet). Data on E85 availability comes from the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). These data includes the station name, station
type (retail or private access12), address, E85 introduction date, and station closure date (when
applicable).
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1. I also provide a visualization of the installed base
of ex-fuel vehicles and the number of E85 retailers in Appendix A. The maps show the spatial
distribution of the ethanol-compatible vehicles and fuel in the Midwestern states at the beginning
and end of the study. Close inspection of the maps reveals a pattern of positive correlation
between the ex-fuel installed base and the number of E85 retailers this pattern is particularly
clear in the southwest portion of Minnesota, which is the states primary corn growing region.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Flex-fuel vehicle registrations
consumer Q1 41292 20.67 35.36 0 553
eet Q2 41292 5.54 40.56 0 2508
E85 stations
retail N 41292 0.03 0.20 0 4
private eN 41292 0.00 0.05 0 2
Consumer variables
population P1 6882 4863.53 6514.06 0 47911
rural proportion rural 6882 0.58 0.45 0 1
median household income (000) income 6882 50.77 20.07 0 270.5
mean age age 6882 38.73 5.75 18.8 80
male percentage male 6882 50.29 3.47 31.3 100
median commute time (min) travel_time 6882 26.79 5.72 15 75
Fleet variables
persons employed P2 41292 2053.06 4135.57 0 60548
total establishments total_stablishments 41292 4907.29 8924.58 0 130757
car rental agencies auto_rentals 41292 0.22 1.01 0 49
mean employee salary (000) avg_salary 6882 25.96 9.11 0 300
Vehicle/fuel supply chain variables
car dealerships auto_dealers 41292 0.96 2.15 0 28
gasoline stations gas_stations 41292 4.23 5.42 0 51
ethanol plants ethanol_plants 41292 0.01 0.08 0 2
corn acres planted corn_acres 6882 196.76 268.11 0 1241.7
Transportation characteristics
interstate highways interstates 6882 0.29 0.53 0 3
market area (sq mi) land_area 6882 79.44 136.81 0.01 3444.1
12Private access refueling stations are typically dedicated facilities serving a single corporate or government eet.
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In total, I observe 853,474 consumer ex-fuel registrations, 228,867 eet ex-fuel registrations
and 459 E85 entry events. To tease out the variation in E85 availability further, in Table 2, I
tabulate observations of the number of E85 retailers and compute the empirical probabilities of
transitions in the number of E85 retailers. The table indicates, for example, that I have 997
observations of markets with an E85 monopolist and that given a monopoly market at time t, in
the next period there is 3.2% probability of observing the rm exit the market, a 90.2% probability
the monopolist remains the sole incumbent, and so on.
Table 2: Observations of retail E85 station incumbency (Nt) and empirical Markov transitions (Nt
to Nt+1)
P (Nmt  ! Nm;t+1) transition
N Obs 0 1 2 3 4
0 40168 0.988 0.011 0.001 0.000 0.000
1 997 0.032 0.902 0.054 0.012 0.000
2 101 0.000 0.073 0.745 0.164 0.018
3 21 0.000 0.000 0.167 0.333 0.500
4 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
Total 41292
Before developing the model, I rst present model free evidence for the existence of a network
e¤ect. The expected patterns are that ex-fuel demand (Q1; Q2) is positively correlated with
the number of E85 retailers (N); and that N is positively correlated with the installed base of
consumer and eet ex fuel vehicles. Calculation of the true installed base involves modeling
initial conditions and vehicle scrap rates,13 which I ignore for the purpose of demonstrating basic
relationships. Here, I use the cumulative number of consumer and eet ex-fuel vehicles as proxies
for the true installed bases.
I provide two types of preliminary evidence for the presence of the network e¤ect. First, in Table
3, I report the conditional distributions of cumulative consumer and eet ex-fuel registrations as
a function of the number of E85 retailers, N: As expected, the installed bases increase in their
mean and median values as N increases.
Table 3: Cumulative ex-fuel vehicle registrations by retail E85 stations
Consumer FFVs Fleet FFVs
N Obs Median Mean Median Mean
0 40168 70.0 132.7 17.6 128.4
1 997 131.8 180.3 49.1 224.3
2 101 209.7 184.1 57.7 88.7
3 21 281.0 241.5 67.4 50.4
4 5 312.6 185.6 104.4 76.5
As a second source of evidence, in Table 4, I report descriptive linear regressions of the dependent
variables Q1; Q2; and N as a function of relevant covariates. I perform the regressions using the
13See Section ?? for a discussion of this issue.
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same control variables as in the main results (including xed e¤ects  see Section 6 for the full
specication), but for brevity I report only the key parameters of interest. The estimates provide
further prima facie evidence for the presence of a network e¤ect: all coe¢ cients have the expected
(positive) signs and are highly signicant.
Table 4: Descriptive regressions of model dependent variables
Dependent variable
Q1 Q2 N
E85 retailers (N) 4.44*** 3.16***
(0.56) (1.04)
consumer FFV installed base 9.4e-05***
(1.1e-05)
eet FFV installed base 3.8e-06***
(1.1e-06)
Observations 41292 41292 41292
RMSE 14.21 26.33 0.14
All regressions include market and period xed e¤ects
Signicance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
4 Model
The model formalizes the interdependence of ex-fuel vehicle demand and E85 market entry. The
demand system relates ex-fuel vehicle purchases to the availability of E85 fuel, while the entry
model relates the number of retail E85 outlets to the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles. Obser-
vations of ex-fuel demand or E85 market entry represent agent decisions to adopt the ethanol
fuel standard. In this sense, the model may be interpreted as a model of technology adoption:
consumers comply with the standard by adopting ex-fuel technology, and fuel retailers comply by
adopting E85 dispensing infrastructure.
I develop the model in three stages. In Section 4.1, I provide an overview of the model and
discuss key assumptions. In Section 4.2 I present the vehicle demand system in detail, while in
Section 4.3 I develop the fuel market entry model. I close the model by formalizing the equilibrium
concept in Section 4.4.
4.1 Framework and assumptions
The model considers the decisions of three types of economic agents: fuel retailers, consumers and
eets. In the case of fuel retailers, the population of interest is the set of rms that may potentially
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enter the E85 market. For consumers, the modeled population is the set of individuals who are
potential buyers of ex-fuel vehicles. In every period, each member of these populations makes a
discrete choice of whether or not to adopt ethanol fuel technology, either by entering the E85 fuel
market (retailers) or purchasing a ex-fuel vehicle (consumers). I model eets in a similar fashion,
abstracting away from complexities associated with centralized decision-making and bulk buying
behavior. That is, eets are e¤ectively treated as individuals who have unit demand for ex-fuel
vehicles.
The conceptual framework of the model is a simultaneous move game. The game models
strategic competition among ex ante identical rms that may potentially enter the E85 market.
Firm competition is strategic due to the fact that each rms entry decision inuences the level of
prots realized by all rms in the market. The moves taken by agents in the game are as follows:
(1) consumers/eets choose whether or not to purchase a ex-fuel vehicle, (2) consumers/eets who
own ex-fuel vehicles set their level of E85 consumption, (3) potential entrants decide whether or
not to enter the E85 market, (4) entering retailers compete in quantities to set E85 output.14 All
these actions are assumed to occur simultaneously. Note that the ex-fuel purchase decisions of
consumers and eets inuence rm prots, as such decisions increase the size of the market for
E85. Therefore, market equilibrium will be dened over the action space of all agents, not just
rms. I assume all agents have complete information, i.e., they have full knowledge of the process
determining market outcomes and directly observe stochastic shocks which are unobserved by the
researcher. The solution concept of the game is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
which I formally dene in Section 4.4.
Throughout the model development, I follow the following notational conventions. I index
markets (zip codes) by m 2 f1; :::;Mg and time periods (years) by t 2 f1; :::; Tg: I index equations
by k 2 f1; 2; 3g for consumer ex-fuel demand, eet ex-fuel demand, and E85 market entry,
respectively. For example, consumer and eet ex-fuel vehicle sales are denoted by Q1mt and Q2mt:
I represent the number of retail and private access (eet dedicated) E85 stations by Nmt and eNmt:
These four variables comprise the endogenous quantities observed in the data. As changes to the
number of private access E85 stations are rare and not of central interest, I do not explicitly modeleNmt, but control for its potential endogeneity in the eet ex-fuel demand estimation through the
use of instrumental variables. Collectively I refer to predetermined market characteristics as Z:
Since prior period outcomes are predetermined in the current period, the history of market outcomes
is included in Z; i.e., fQ1m ; Q2m ; Nmg<t 2 Zmt: I denote the model parameters collectively as
 = (12; 3) ; where 12 represents all (consumer and eet) ex-fuel demand parameters and 3
captures the E85 market entry and error term covariance parameters.
14Under the assumption of identical rms, a price setting game results in the familiar Bertrand paradox, implying
marginal cost pricing for all rms. An output setting game avoids this complication and captures the key feature of
interest that prots should decline in the number of entering rms.
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4.2 Flex-fuel demand
4.2.1 Consumers
Following Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), I model consumer demand for ex-
fuel vehicles as a utility maximizing discrete choice. In each period t, the population of consumers
of market m, P1mt; choose between purchasing a ex-fuel vehicle (1) and the outside alternative (0),
which is normalized to have zero utility in expectation. The choice-specic utilities for individual
consumer i are assumed to take the following form:
U1imt = 1Nmt + 
0
1Z1mt + 1m + !1t + 1mt + 
1
imt (1)
 U1mt + 1mt + 1imt
U0imt = 
0
imt
The utility of choice 1 appearing in equation (1) captures the consumers valuation of ex-fuel
technology as a function of the availability of E85 fuel, which is given by the number of E85 retailers
operating in the market, N . The associated 1 parameter is the primary coe¢ cient of interest 
this parameter reects the inuence of E85 availability on consumer utility, and therefore captures
the feedback of E85 market entry on ex-fuel vehicle adoption. The 1 parameter captures the
inuence of all other relevant time and market-time varying factors. The term 1mt is a market and
period specic shock to ex-fuel utility which is common to all consumers. The terms 0imt and
1imt capture individual i
0s idiosyncratic preferences for the choice options.
All consumers in a market are identical up to draws of their individual valuation components,
0imt and 
1
imt: I assume these shocks are distributed i.i.d. extreme value. The extreme value
assumption implies that choice market shares follow the standard logit formula:
H11mt  Pr

U1imt > U
0
imt

=
exp
 
U1mt + 1mt

1 + exp
 
U1mt + 1mt
 = Q1mt
P1mt
(2)
H01mt  Pr

U1imt  U0imt

=
1
1 + exp
 
U1mt + 1mt
 = P1mt  Q1mt
P1mt
H11 and H
0
1 are the consumer choice shares of ex-fuel vehicles and the outside option, respec-
tively. In this formulation, consumers are assumed to be in the market for a ex-fuel vehicle every
period, allowing for the possibility of replacement sales.15 By algebraic manipulation of the market
15An alternative assumption, commonly used in the durable goods literature, would be that vehicles are inntely
durable and once consumers purchase a ex-fuel vehicle, they are permanently out of the market. Given the long time
span of my sample (six years), I choose to allow replacement sales. This choice is consistent with my computation of
the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles, which explicitly accounts for vehicle scrappage. In practice, this assumption
has little e¤ect on demand estimates, as market populations are generally very large in comparision to cumulative
ex-fuel sales.
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share equations above, we may write the following estimation equation16:
H1mt  ln
 
H11mt
  ln  H01mt = ln Q1mtPm  Q1mt

= U1mt + 1mt (3)
The variable H1 is the log-odds ratio of consumer ex-fuel vehicle purchase. Estimation of
equation (3) is discussed in Section 5.
The utility specication (1) employs extremely strong controls for unobservables through the
inclusion of market (1) and period (!1) xed e¤ects: The market xed e¤ects control for all
time-invariant market heterogeneity that may be correlated with Q1: Inclusion of market xed
e¤ects is particularly signicant for my application, since estimation will be conducted under an
assumption of independent markets. This assumption is far more plausible when these controls
are included, since they capture all time-invariant spatial dependence in observations of consumer
ex-fuel demand. The period xed e¤ects control for common temporal shocks to ex-fuel demand,
such as changes in the variety of ex-fuel models, availability of federal tax credits, and average
fuel prices. With the inclusion of these xed e¤ects, the variation identifying the 1 parameter
will be deviations in H1 and N from the market-specic mean values (i.e., withindeviations),
controlling for period-specic shocks common to all markets.
4.2.2 Fleets
As previously mentioned, I simplify the treatment of eet ex-fuel demand by ignoring bulk-buying
behavior. Rather, I model eets as individuals, who make a discrete choice of whether or not to
purchase a ex-fuel vehicle. Therefore, the eet demand system is identical in form (but not in
specication) to the consumer demand system. The choice-specic utilities for eet i are assumed
to take the following form:
U1imt = 21Nmt + 22
eNmt + 02Z2mt + 2m + !2t + 2mt + 1imt (4)
 U2mt + 2mt + 1imt
U0imt = 
0
imt
16 In empirical specications, I calculate H1mt using H1mt = ln

+Q1mt
+Pm Q1mt

as this avoids the technical problem
of innite negative utility encountered when Q1mt = 0: Minimizing the occurrence of this condition motivates using
a yearly panel over one with a ner time frequency. Still, I observe no ex-fuel sales in 14% of observations, typically
in markets with small populations. For the correction I set  = 0:5; as this value is shown by Pettigrew, Gart, and
Thomas (1986) to be the bias-minimizing value: Pettigrew, Gart, and Thomas (1986) also derive the asymptotic
bias of this empirical approximation to the true log-odds ratio, and show that it is given by 2p 1
24(np(1 p))2 + O(n
3);
where p is the true individual adoption probability and n is the number of trials per observation. In my application
p s :005 while n s 5000; implying an asymptotic bias of order  10 5; which is clearly negligible. As a robustness
check of the potential bias introduced by this approximation, I estimated the consumer demand model setting  = 0
and only using observations for which Q1mt > 0: The estimate of 1 from this model was consistent with the main
results within one standard deviation and 4% in absolute magnitude.
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This utility specication di¤ers from the consumer utility specication in two ways. First, an-
other potentially endogenous variable appears: the number of private access E85 refueling stations
( eN), which are dedicated facilities serving a single eet. Whereas the presence of private access
refueling stations should not a¤ect consumer utility for ethanol-compatible vehicles, these facilities
may impact the observed share of ex-fuel vehicles among eets. eN is potentially endogenous be-
cause unobserved factors that lead to installation of a eet-dedicated E85 station may be correlated
with eet ex-fuel demand (presumably, construction of a dedicated E85 refueling station signals
a eets intention to increase its investment in ex-fuel vehicles). Even though I do not explicitly
model the entryof such stations, I must control for the potential endogeneity of eN through the
use of instrumental variables. The other di¤erence from the consumer demand specication is the
factors which enter Z2:
Following the logic of the previous section, the estimation equation for eet ex-fuel demand is:
H2mt = ln

Q2mt
P2mt  Q2mt

= U2mt + 2mt (5)
A nal comment relates to the empirical specication of the eet market size, P2: Whereas the
population of consumers (P1) is well documented in Census data, the appropriate measure of P2
is less obvious. For consistency with the assumption of eets as individuals with unit demand for
ex-fuel vehicles, I need a proxy for the total number of potential eet sales to represent P2. My
approach is to use the number of persons employed in the market as this proxy. The number of
employees is a reasonable measure for the potential population of eet vehicles, as eet vehicles
are typically assigned to employees. To mitigate concerns about the market size denition, I
demonstrate in Appendix D.3 that the estimated parameters are generally robust to alternative
specications of P2:
4.3 E85 Market Entry
Fuel retailer entry into the E85 market is modeled in the tradition of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). These models assume that the number of rms in the market, N; is the
outcome of a two-stage game of complete information played among E identical potential entrants.
In the rst stage, rms make strategic entry decisions, anticipating the ensuing competition in
output during the second stage. Potentially entering rms are assumed to have identical prot
functions, which are stochastic due to the presence of market level shocks to protability that are
common to all rms.17 Under these assumptions, N reects bounds on a latent prot function,
which may recovered through the estimation procedure. The intuition behind the approach is that
in a symmetric equilibrium, an observation of N = k rms implies k  0 and k+1 < 0; where
N represents prots in a market with N rms.
17See Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) for a discussion of the implications of this assumption.
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Berry and Reiss (2007) discuss di¤erent approaches to specifying N ; and advocate deriving
the appropriate reduced form from explicit assumptions about rm costs, the demand specication,
and the second stage equilibrium process. I adopt this approach and begin by developing a model
for E85 fuel demand. I decompose E85 demand (D) into the product of the market size (S) and
per-capita demand, which I model as linear in E85 prices, as follows:
D =
NX
f=1
df = S (a  P ) (6)
Here f indexes the fuel retailers active in a market and df represents the per-rm demand for
ethanol fuel. The coe¢ cient on E85 fuel price (P ) is set to -1 without loss of generality, as this
simply scales the quantity units in which price is quoted.18 Next I assume second stage competition
among ethanol retailers is a Cournot output game. In Appendix D, I explore the robustness of my
results to alternative assumptions about rm competition. Under the assumption of independent
market outcomes, strategic competition is limited to potential entrants within the market. The
E85 fuel demand model is closed by specifying the rm cost function, which I take to be linear in
output and common to all rms:
Cf = cdf + F (7)
Constant marginal costs are a reasonable assumption for a motor fuel retailer, since the retailer
is not directly involved with ethanol production and has few mechanisms by which to achieve scale
economies.
I now derive the reduced form prot function corresponding to the symmetric Cournot equilib-
rium. Using equation (6), the inverse demand curve may be written as:
P = a  D
S
= a  1
S
NX
f=1
df
In Cournot competition, rms complete in quantities. The rst order condition for rm f is
given by:
18Moreover, price e¤ects cannot be separately identifed using observations of N alone, as the price coe¢ cient is
interacted with the market size, which must be normalized to set the scale of variable prots.
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@Nf
@df
=
@
@df
[df (P   c)  F ] = 0
= P   c+ df @P
@df
= 0
= a  1
S
NX
f=1
df   c+ df

  1
S

= 0
The symmetry of rms implies that
NP
f=1
df = Ndf : Using this condition and solving for optimal
rm quantity yields:
df =
S
1 +N
(a  c) (8)
The equilibrium market price will therefore be:
P  = a  Nd

f
S
= a  N
1 +N
(a  c) (9)
Finally, reduced form prots may be expressed as:
N = Nf = (P
   c)df   F = S
(a  c)2
(1 +N)2
  F (10)
To convert this model into an econometric specication, we must clarify how stochastic terms
enter rm prots and how to parameterize the terms S; (a  c)2 ; and F . Following Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991), I assume unobservable rm prots enter N linearly as shocks to xed costs. The
shock to xed costs is common to all rms, and is given by 3mt: As rms are ex ante identical,
I represent observable xed costs as a linear function of exogenous market-level cost shifters (Z3).
Thus, xed costs for all rms are given by Ffmt = Fmt = 0Z3mt+ 3mt: The term (a  c)2 captures
the E85 fuel demand intercept and marginal costs, the constituents of rm variable prots. I
parameterize (a  c)2 as a function of exogenous E85 variable cost and demand shifters (Z4). I
enforce positivity of variable prots by letting (a  c)2mt = exp ( 0Z4mt) :
The expression for market size, S; requires a more involved discussion. The complication which
arises is due to the fact that the E85 entry model is linked to the ex-fuel demand system through
the market size, which is a function current ex-fuel demand. Thus, the market size is endogenous
to N: For generality, I follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and assume S may be represented as a
linear function of the installed base of consumer ex-fuel vehicles, the installed base of eet ex-
fuel vehicles, and exogenous market-level shifters of the e¤ective market size (Z5): For notational
convenience, I dene the prior period installed base of ex-fuel vehicles for agent type k (1 =
consumer, 2 = eet); as Bkmt 
t 1P
=0
Qkm ; which is predetermined in period t: Therefore, the
16
current period installed base of agent type k ex-fuel vehicles is given by Bkmt +Qkmt: With this
notation, the market size may be represented as:
Smt(Nmt) = (B1mt +Q1mt) +  (B2mt +Q2mt) + 
0Z5mt (11)
The coe¢ cient on the installed base of consumer ex-fuel vehicles is set to one as the expression
for variable prots (which is interacted with the market size in equation (10)) includes a constant,
implying a normalization of market size is required for identication. The normalization converts
E85 demand into units of consumer ex-fuel vehicles. This implies, for example, that the 
coe¢ cient in equation (11) may be interpreted as the estimated number of eet ex-fuel vehicles
required to match the fuel consumption of one consumer ex-fuel vehicle. Note that I write S as
a function of N to highlight the fact that installed bases of consumer and eet ex-fuel vehicles
are implicit functions of N through current period ex-fuel vehicle demand, Q1 and Q2. This
notation also emphasizes that it is through the N dependence of market size that positive feedback
in ethanol adoption is realized in the entry model for the current period. Feedback e¤ects in
prior periods are incorporated into B1 and B2; which are predetermined and do not depend on the
current value of N: This is the key force driving the network e¤ect in the model.
Although agents in the market have complete information and therefore know the exact form
of S; the analyst must contend with uncertainty introduced by two types of unobservables. First,
since the vehicle demand shocks enter the expression for market size (11), from the econometricians
perspective S is a random variable whose distribution is induced through the joint distribution of
1 2 3

. To see this, note that equations (3) and (5) imply that the current period ex-fuel
sales Q1 and Q2 are (non-linear) functions of 1 and 2: Second, the econometrician does not know
the exact values of B1 or B2; since vehicle scrappage is not observed, nor are the sales of ex-fuel
vehicles prior to the inception of the study. The estimation procedure I develop in Section 5.2
takes account of both types of uncertainty associated with market size.
Putting the aforementioned specications together, and dening expected rms prots as 
N
;
the model for N taken to data is:
Nmt =
EX
k=0
k

kmt  0

k+1mt < 0

(12)
where :
Nmt =
(
0 if Nmt = 0

N
mt   3mt if 0 < Nmt  E
)

N
mt  Smt(Nmt)
exp ( 0Z4mt)
(1 +Nmt)
2   0Z3mt
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4.4 Equilibrium
Before formally dening the equilibrium, it is important to clarify the relationship between the
game strategies of individual potentially entering rms, which are unobserved, and observations of
the number of rms (N) : An individual rm strategy may be represented as If 2 f0; 1g where 1
indicates entry and 0 indicates staying out of the market. Since our game has E players, a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium obtains when the condition
f (I

1 ; :::; I

f ; :::; I

E)  f (I1 ; :::; If ; :::; IE) 8If 2 f0; 1g
holds for all rms f 2 f1; :::; Eg: As shown in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), this Nash solution
concept does not uniquely determine the identity of entering rms. For example, with identical
rms in a market that can protably sustain a monopolist, there are E pure strategy solutions to
the game (the f = 1; :::; E strategies for which If = 1; I

k = 0 8 k 6= f). However, since only one set
of strategies will be played, the equilibrium number of entering rms, N =
EP
k=1
Ik = 1 is uniquely
determined. The potential for multiple equilibria, which would severely complicate estimation of
the model, is removed by aggregating outcomes. I take this approach and dene the equilibrium
in terms of the aggregated equilibrium strategies of potentially entering E85 retailers.
Uniqueness of the symmetric Nash equilibrium in N is guaranteed provided that rm prots
decline in the number of rms entering the market. If this condition is violated, a unique ordering
of N is no longer guaranteed, and the potential for multiple equilibria once again arises. In entry
models such as Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), this condition is imposed in estimation of the model
of N as an ordered dependent variable. Other models satisfy the condition by specifying a prot
function that declines in N , such as Berry (1992). This is essentially the approach I take, but I
require a further renement. The presence of the indirect network e¤ect, i.e. the fact that the
market size is a function of N; admits the (mathematical) possibility that prots could increase in
the number of rms. I rule out this possibility by imposing the constraint that @
N
@N  0 hold for
all markets when estimating equation (12). That is, I impose that increases in rm prots from an
expanded market size (via the network e¤ect in S(N)) cannot be larger than decreases in prots
from additional competition (via the 1
(1+N)2
term entering variable prots). The constraint, which
is derived in Appendix B, takes the following form:
1Q1mt
1 + exp (H1mt)
+
21Q2mt
1 + exp (H2mt)
  2Smt
1 +Nmt
 0 (13)
I impose this constraint when estimating equation (12). Fortunately, the data reveal ex-post
that the conditions of a unique equilibrium are satised  i.e., the constraint does not bind for
the estimated parameter vector. This result is expected, for if it were the case that the network
e¤ect were stronger than the competitive e¤ect, the model would predict only two possible market
outcomes: zero or complete market adoption of the ethanol standard by all agents, depending upon
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the level of market xed costs. The data reject this notion out of hand by the very existence of a
distribution in agent adoption rates of ethanol.
Since consumer and eet ex-fuel purchase decisions inuence E85 retailer prots, the equilib-
rium concept must also encompass their actions. Formally then, the symmetric Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies for this model is dened by the number of entering E85 retailers N; the num-
ber of consumer ex-fuel vehicle sales Q1; and the number of eet ex-fuel vehicle sales Q2 that
simultaneously satisfy equations (3), (5), (12), and (13).
5 Estimation
I develop a two-step procedure to estimate equations (3), (5) and (12) under constraint (13). I
motivate this choice in the method overview discussion in Section 5.1. I begin with discussion
of the entry model estimation in Section 5.2, which is the second step in the overall procedure, in
order to defer the technicalities that accompany describing the System GMM procedure. I follow
in Section 5.3 with discussion of estimation of the ex-fuel demand system, which is the rst step
of the overall procedure.
5.1 Method overview
The primary challenge for estimation is nding an appropriate estimator for the E85 entry model.
The ex-fuel demand equations may be transformed to a linear system, and thus permit a wide
variety of estimators since instruments for the endogenous variables N and eN are available (I discuss
the instruments and identication in Section 5.3 and Appendix C). The entry model, however, is
highly non-linear in parameters, necessitating the use of either a likelihood-based or moment-based
estimator. I therefore consider the problem of how to consistently estimate the entry equation
conditional upon the ex-fuel demand parameters (12); which constitutes the second step of the
estimation procedure. Conceptually, there are two potential sources of endogeneity in the market
size, S: First, referring to equations (1) and (4), N directly enters the expressions for consumer
and eet ex-fuel utility. Therefore, Q1 and Q2 in the expression for S are explicit functions of
N: However, with consistent estimates of 12 in hand, this dependency is fully accounted for when
computing S for estimation of the entry model. A second source of endogeneity arises through the
stochastic terms  i.e., the entry model error term 3 is potentially correlated with the demand
system error terms 1 and 2; which also determine Q1 and Q2: These terms may be correlated
through common unobservables that a¤ect both ex-fuel demand and the protability of E85
market entry. An example of such an unobservable might be a regional campaign of public service
announcements touting the benets of ethanol to the community. It might at rst seem tractable
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to compute the market size in the entry model by conditioning on both the demand system residuals
as well as the demand system parameter estimates. That is, given a candidate parameter vector
for the entry model (3), one might be tempted to express the market size S = S(3 j Z; b12;b1;b2):
However, to do so would ignore the fact that 1 and 2 are co-determined with N; through equations
(1) and (4): In other words, 1 and 2 may not be held xed when tting the model to data.
My approach to controlling for both sources of endogeneity mentioned above is to work with
the reduced form of the model, given the demand parameters. That is, for a candidate entry
model parameter vector, I solve the nonlinear system (3), (5) and (12) for the equilibrium number
of entering rms, N: This solution process ensures consistency of the estimated parameters, since
all cross-equation dependencies are reected in the resulting value of N: I base estimation on
minimizing the di¤erence (in the sum squares sense) between the model predicted number of rms,
N; and the observed number of entering rms, N . This non-linear least squares estimator is a
variant of GMM.
A requirement to solve for N is that the error vector  is known.  is not directly observed, but
draws of  may be simulated if we are willing to take a stand on its joint distribution (as one would
when pursuing a likelihood-based approach). I assume  to be distributed multivariate normal:
0B@1mt2mt
3mt
1CA s N(0;); where  =
0B@ 
2
1 1212 131
1212 
2
2 232
131 232 1
1CA (14)
Unobserved E85 retailer protability (3); which has a natural interpretation as a shock to xed
costs, is normalized to have unit variance in order to identify the parameters of the entry model.
As is customary in latent variable models, this normalization sets the scale of E85 retailer prots,
which are unobserved. Note that while 1 and 2 may not be held xed, we may use the rst step
residuals to estimate 1; 2; and 12: In particular, b1 = pV ar (b1) , b2 = pV ar (b2); and b12 =
Corr(b1;b2): The remaining covariance terms, 13 and 23; are parameters to be estimated with the
entry equation. I implement the estimator by drawing multiple  vectors for each observation,19
solving the reduced form for N for every draw of ; and then averaging the result to integrate the
e¤ects of  out of the objective function. In Appendix D, I also report results from estimating the
entry model by maximum likelihood, under the restriction that 13 = 23 = 0; and nd very close
agreement with the unrestricted estimator.
A nal step must be taken for valid inference. Using estimated demand parameters (b12) in the
entry model estimation introduces the potential for measurement error, since b12 is an imprecise
measurement of 12. The standard errors of the entry model parameters (3) must reect this
additional uncertainty. To address this issue, I perform a nonparametric panel bootstrap over the
two-step procedure. That is, I resample market histories with replacement and perform the two-
19This step is performed once, prior to the entry model estimation, using standard normal draws. The value of 
is recomputed as the entry parameter (3) vector changes by taking the product of  and the Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix implied by 3.
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step estimation procedure BS times. Parameter standard errors are then given by the standard
deviations of bootstrapped parameter values. Estimates reported in Section 6 are based upon BS =
30 replications. In the reported results, both ex-fuel demand and E85 entry model parameters
have bootstrapped standard errors. Using bootstrapped standard errors implies inference will be
robust to the e¤ects of heteroskedasticity, provided the estimation sample is truly representative of
the general population.
5.2 E85 entry equation
Here I develop a procedure to estimate the E85 entry model that allows for arbitrary correlation
between the market entry equation and the ex-fuel demand equations. Promotional activity by
a regional ethanol trade organization might be one example of such a common unobserved e¤ect.
In Appendix D.1, I develop an alternative entry model estimator under the assumption of no
correlation between the entry model error term and the ex-fuel demand error terms.
As discussed in the estimation method overview (Section 5.1), estimation of the entry model
parameters is conducted conditional upon estimates of the vehicle demand parameters (12). Un-
certainty introduced into the entry model estimation from imprecise measurement of the demand
parameters is controlled for by bootstrapping over the two step estimation procedure, in which
entire market histories are sampled with replacement. The key insight that motivates the chosen
estimator is that, given the demand parameters and simulated draws of the error terms ; the re-
duced form of the model may be solved for N; the model-predicted equilibrium number of entering
E85 retailers. Consequently, if the demand parameters are correctly identied, the entry model
may be consistently estimated without the use of exogenous instruments for the endogenous market
size. Consistency follows from the fact that explicitly solving the model automatically incorporates
all cross-equation dependencies into the resulting value of N: Intuitively, estimation proceeds
by minimizing the squared di¤erence between the model predicted number of rms, N; and the
observed number of entering rms, N . This non-linear least squares estimator is given by:
b3 = arg min
3
X
m;t
 
Nmt   1
NS
NSX
s=1
Nsmt
!2
(15)
subject to :
@Nmt
@N
 0 8m; t
Obtaining simulated draws of the error terms requires an assumption about the joint distribution
of : As discussed in Section 5.1, I assume a multivariate normal distribution for : The variance-
covariance terms of the ex-fuel demand errors (1; 2; 12) may be estimated from the residuals
of the ex-fuel demand estimation (b1;b2). Since the variance of the entry model error term 3 is
normalized to 1 in order to identify the parameters, only the cross-equation correlations (13; 23)
are unknown. These parameters are to be estimated in together with the parameters that enter
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the E85 prot function explicitly (; ;  ; ): If the correlations 13 and 23 turn out signicant
in the entry model estimation, it is evidence for the presence of common unobserved shocks that
inuence both ex-fuel demand and E85 entry. If these coe¢ cients are insignicant, it suggests
that the model specication already fully captures the relevant co-dependence of the demand and
entry systems. Per capita variable prot factors ( ) are identied through interactions with the
market size, consisting primarily of the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles. Fixed cost factors ()
are identied by the (conditional) mean values of N .
Potential concerns with a non-linear least squares estimator relate to matters of econometric
e¢ ciency and algorithm convergence. To appreciate the concerns, consider the predicted number
of rms based on a single draw of : The value of N resulting from this draw could be very di¤erent
from E[N] if the draw originates in the tail of the distribution. The resulting objective function
is unlikely to be smooth, hindering an optimizers ability to nd the optimal parameter vector.
The discrete nature of N will tend to magnify this problem since outcomes are determined by
truncation points of the latent prot function, small changes in parameter values can lead to large
changes in N. The standard errors of the estimated parameters are therefore also likely to be
large, limiting the ability to conduct inference. A solution to these issues is to integrate the e¤ect
of the unobservables out of the objective function by taking multiple draws of  for every observed
market and averaging the resulting N: That is, I compute the expected equilibrium number of
rms by E[N] = 1NS
NSP
s=1
Nsmt , where NS is the number of simulated draws of : In my empirical
work, I take NS = 30; which should be a reasonable estimate of the asymptotic value of E[N];
given the normality assumption.
5.2.1 Computation of N
Next, I explain the calculation of N; the model-predicted equilibrium number of entering E85
retailers. First note that equations (3) and (5) imply that unit sales of ex-fuel vehicles may be
written:
Q1(n j b12) = P1 exp (b1n+ 1 + k1)
1 + exp (b1n+ 1 + k1)
Q2(n j b12) = P2 exp (b21n+ 2 + k2)
1 + exp (b21n+ 2 + k2)
where I have suppressed subscripts and introduced the shorthand notations k1 = H1  b1N b1,
k2 = H2   b21N   b2: The values of k1 and k2 are the predicted purchase log-odds ratios with the
e¤ect of the observed number of rms N partialed out. This ensures that the predicted values
of Q1(n) and Q2(n) include the market xed e¤ects ; which are not estimated explicitly in the
demand estimation. All factors other than n are xed in the above equations (here, 1 and 2 are
simulated error terms). Given a candidate entry model parameter vector (3); the market size may
then be computed by equation (11) and hence the reduced form prot N may be derived from
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equation (12). The system may not be solved analytically for N; but numerical solution of the
system in straightforward. N is given by the smallest value of n (for n > 0) that satises the
condition (n  0) \  n+1 < 0.
The previous discussion of computing N ignored a technical but important detail relating to
the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles. In equation (11), B denotes the prior period installed base,
which is intended to represent the number of ex-fuel vehicles on road at the end of the previous
year. Even though I observe all ex-fuel vehicle purchases throughout the period of my study, the
true value of B is unobserved, for two reasons. First, I do not observe ex-fuel vehicle demand in
periods prior to 2001 (t = 1), resulting in an initial conditions problem.20 I employ two assumptions
that allow me to integrate uncertainty about initial conditions out of the objective function. The
rst pertains to ex-fuel vehicle sales in unobserved periods. I assume that the proportion of ex-
fuel vehicles produced which are sold into a market for a given year follows a truncated normal
distribution with known mean and variance. In a preliminary step, I estimate these means and
variances market by market using the six yearly observations of ex-fuel vehicle sales (R.L. Polk
data) and the aggregate ex-fuel vehicle production quantities for the corresponding year. The
latter are available from the Department of Energy and date to the rst production year for ex-fuel
vehicles.21 To simulate ex-fuel vehicle sales for unobserved periods, I draw the sales proportion
from the corresponding market distribution and multiply by the aggregate ex-fuel production for
that period. As with draws of the error terms ; I take NS = 30 draws per market, so that the
e¤ect of the initial conditions are integrated out of the objective function when E[N] is computed.
The second source of uncertainty relates to unobserved vehicle retirement. I take vehicle survival
rates to be exogenous, common to all markets, and time-stationary (rates depend only upon the
time di¤erence between purchase and the current period). Further, I assume these rates are as
quoted in the Department of Transportations Transportation Energy Data Book (Davis and Diegel
(2006)). Under these assumptions, the prior period installed base for agent type k is given by:
Bkmt =
t 1P
= 1
wt Qkm , where w is the survival rate, Qkm is data for  > 0; and Qkm are
simulation draws for   0: The fact that I explicitly model retirement of ex-fuel vehicles is
consistent with the demand model assumption of allowing replacement sales.
A nal implementation detail concerns the constraint in equation (15), which is expressed in
terms of parameters and observables in equation (13). I implement the constraint using a penalty
function during estimation. That is, I set N =  1 if the constraint is violated. The constraint
does not bind at the converged parameter value.
20Commercial production of ex-fuel vehicles began in 1996, but signicant quantities were not produced until
1998.
21Available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/data/vehicles.html.
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5.3 Flex-fuel demand equations
I begin with a discussion of the implications of the model structure for estimation of the ex-fuel
demand equations. First note that collectively, equations (3), (5) and (12) represent a static model
with feedback. That is, current period ex-fuel vehicle demand (Q1mt; Q2mt) depends only upon
the current value of E85 availability (Nmt); but because Nmt is a function of the installed bases
of ex-fuel vehicles, Nmt depends upon the entire history of vehicle demand outcomes up to the
current period, i.e.  :   t: In particular, note that current shocks to ex-fuel demand (1mt; 2mt)
will be correlated with current and future values of N: However, given the exogeneity of Z and
predetermination of prior values of N; the following conditional expectations hold:
E (1mt j Z1; 1m; !1t; Nm ) = 0 8 < t (16)
E

2mt j Z2; 2m; !2t; Nm ; eNm = 0 8 < t (17)
This structure has important consequences for estimation. In particular, the fact that 1mt and
2mt are correlated with future values of N implies that the usual time-demeaning transformation
to remove the market xed e¤ects 1m and 2m will lead to biased estimates.22 However, a
rst di¤erence procedure to remove the market xed e¤ects remains consistent under the weaker
assumption of sequential exogeneity of N implied by (16) and (17). Taking rst di¤erences of
equations (3) and (5) yields:
H1mt = 1Nmt + 
0
1Z1mt + !1t + 1mt (18)
H2mt = 21Nmt + 22 eNmt + 02Z2mt + !2t + 2mt (19)
Henceforth, I refer to equations (16) and (17) as the di¤erenceequations, and equations (3)
and (5) as the level equations. Absent contemporaneous correlation between the N variables
and the error terms, OLS estimation of equations (18) and (19) would deliver consistent estimates.
However, N is endogenous in (18) and (19) since H1 and H2 are simultaneously determined
with N through (12). Although entry of private E85 facilities is not explicitly modeled, a similar
concern applies to  eN (here, the endogeneity concern arises from the possibility of an omitted
variable correlated with eet vehicle demand and eN): The general remedy for these complications
is to employ instrumental variables: However, nding exogenous variables which meet the criteria
of being correlated with N and  eN but not the error terms 1 and 2 can be challenging.
One appealing approach is to bring additional exogenous data to bear. In other words, nd a set
of externalinstruments W that shift N but do not enter the specication of vehicle demand (i.e.,
W 2 Z=Z1 [ Z2): Unfortunately, suitable instruments of this type are not available.23 I therefore
22See, for example, Wooldridge (2002), Section 11.1 for a discussion of this issue.
23 In Appendix C, I motivate several instrumentation strategies using data collected for the study and present
the corresponding demand estimates. The instruments are motivated by considering the form of the E85 retailer
prot function (10), which is decomposed into shifters of market size, xed costs, and variable prots. I construct
instruments corresponding to each type of prot shifter. For each set of results, I report diagnostic tests of instrument
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pursue an alternative strategy that exploits the panel structure of the data and the orthogonality
conditions implied by (16) and (17):
E (1mtNm ) = 0 8 :   t  2 (20)
E (2mtNm ) = 0 8 :   t  2 (21)
E

2mt eNm = 0 8 :   t  2 (22)
In particular, these conditions mean that values of N lagged by two or more periods are valid
instruments forN; i.e., fNm :   t  2gmay serve as an instruments forNmt: Similar relations
hold for eN . Therefore, a valid instrument matrix for market m observations in the di¤erence
equation (18) may be expressed as:
W1m 
0BBBB@
Z1m3 1t Nm1 0 0 ::: 0
Z1m4 1t Nm1 Nm2 0 ::: 0
...
...
Z1mT 1t Nm1 Nm2 Nm3 ::: Nm;T 2
1CCCCA (23)
I use the notation of 1t to represent a row vector whose ith element is equal to 1 if i = t; where
t is the period of the corresponding observation. This construct captures the period xed e¤ects
in equation (18). The W matrix reects the fact that for the strictly exogenous variables Z and
the period xed e¤ects !1t, the di¤erenced values may properly serve as their own instruments.
GMM estimation in rst di¤erences using instruments like those found in equation (23) is a
variant of the Arellano and Bond (1991) estimator. The Arellano-Bond estimator is typically
applied to dynamic panel data models that have lagged dependent variables on the right hand side,
but it is equally applicable to static models with endogenous regressors. Two tests are available
to substantiate the validity of this approach to identication. First, a formal requirement for the
exogeneity of lagged levels of N is that no serial autocorrelation is present in : A test proposed
by Arellano and Bond (1991), checks for serial autocorrelation in the GMM residuals by testing
for second order autocorrelation (AR(2)) in :24 Second, as is standard for GMM estimators,
the Hansen J test (Hansen (1982)) of overidentifying restrictions may be used to test that the
instruments are properly excluded from the estimation equation. I report these tests in the main
results (Section 6) and in my comparison of di¤erent instruments provided in Appendix C. As
discussed in those sections, I nd that the required conditions hold for my model.
As pointed out by Arellano and Bover (1995), if there is considerable persistence in the endoge-
nous variable (i.e., it approximates a random walk), use of the standard Arellano-Bond estimator
power and proper exclusion. In all cases, the candidate instruments fail the diagnostic test for weak instruments.
24After transforming to rst di¤erences, testing for AR(1) in  in the original estimation equation is equivalent to
testing for AR(2) in : The test statistic is given by
P
m;t
m;tm;t 2; which is normally distributed under the null of
no serial autocorrelation.
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can still result in a weak instruments problem, since lagged levels alone may have poor predictive
power for rst di¤erences. This is the case in my application, as N has limited within-market
variation (i.e., E85 market entry is rare). A potential solution to this problem, posed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and fully developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), is to make use of additional
moment conditions to improve e¢ ciency. The key insight of these papers is that, the equation
in levels may be consistently estimated using instruments that are orthogonal to the xed e¤ects.
Time invariant regressors may therefore enter the equation in levels, since such variables are clearly
orthogonal to the market xed e¤ect. This is particularly convenient, as it provides a means to
estimate the e¤ects of time invariant regressors while maintaining controls for market-level un-
observables. Under an additional assumption, described momentarily, lagged di¤erences of the
endogenous variables are valid instruments for the endogenous variable in levels. The instrument
matrix for the levelsequation may then be expressed as:
W1m 
0BBBB@
Z1m2 1t Nm2 0 0 ::: 0
Z1m3 1t Nm2 Nm2 0 ::: 0
...
...
Z1mT 1t Nm1 Nm2 Nm3 ::: Nm;T 2
1CCCCA (24)
Estimation proceeds by stacking the levelsequation on top of the di¤erencesequation and
applying the usual GMM procedure to the joint system. To summarize, the moment conditions for
the consumer ex-fuel demand system may be written:
E[W11] = 0 (25)
E[W11] = 0
The eet demand equation takes a similar form, but the instrument matrices also include lags
of dedicated-access E85 facilities ( eN): The resulting system GMM estimator delivers highly
e¢ cient estimates under the stated assumptions.
The additional assumption necessary for doing system GMMis that correlation of the xed
e¤ect with the endogenous variable is time-invariant. In the case of (18), this condition translates
to E(1mNmt) = 0; which implies a weak form of stationarity on the stochastic process generating
N . The condition holds if there are no systematic deviations across markets in the observed rate of
E85 retailer entry across markets with di¤erent mean levels of consumer utility for ex-fuel vehicles.
In other words, departures from the steady-state of N is idiosyncratic across markets. If ex-fuel
vehicle installed bases are in steady-state, we would expect this condition to hold, since rm prots
would then be time invariant. To the extent that installed bases have not yet reached steady-state
in the sampled data, we might expect E(1N) > 0, since higher mean consumer ex-fuel utility
should translate into more rapid growth of the installed base and hence a higher frequency of E85
retailer entry. Whether or not the assumption is problematic in nite samples turns on what
factors are captured by the xed e¤ects  across markets. However, problems arising from this
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condition should be reected in tests of the exogeneity of the instruments, which are not rejected
in my model.
6 Results
The results are presented in two sections. In Section 6.1, I present and discuss the main estimation
results. I present robustness checks of many of the key model assumptions in Appendix D.
6.1 Main estimation results
6.1.1 Flex-fuel demand
I begin discussion of the results with the ex-fuel demand model estimates, which are presented in
Table 5. The dependent variables are the log-odds ratios of ex-fuel purchase by consumers (H1;
rst column) and eets (H2; second column). For brevity, I suppress estimates of xed e¤ects. I
rst comment on the diagnostic tests that substantiate the validity of the instruments employed.
The null hypothesis of no serial autocorrelation in the residuals is not rejected at the 5% level in
both the consumer and eet equations, indicating use of the estimator is valid. For both demand
systems, the test of overidentifying restrictions (H0 : exclusion restrictions are valid) is also not
rejected at the 5% level, suggesting that the lagged values of N (and eN) are properly excluded
from the ex-fuel demand equation. I also perform a weak instruments test by testing the joint
signicance of lagged values of N in a regression of demand model controls on N: This is analogous
to the F test of excluded instruments reported in the two stage least squares regressions. The large
(>>10) value of this F statistic provides further evidence that the instruments have identifying
power.
Focusing on the consumer ex-fuel demand estimates, the key parameter (1) is the coe¢ cient
on the number of E85 retailers (N): This coe¢ cient captures the demand sideof the network
e¤ect, i.e., the e¤ect of E85 availability on consumer ex-fuel demand. As anticipated, this
coe¢ cient is positive and highly signicant. The marginal e¤ects of ethanol fuel entry on ex-fuel
sales are compiled in the following table25:
25To deduce the marginal e¤ect of changes E85 availability on ex-fuel vehicle sales (Q1), two issues must be
considered. First, evaluation of the marginal e¤ect must account for the discrete nature of N: That is, the quantity
of interest is not the elasticity N
Q
@Q1(1;N)
@N
but rather the proportional change Q1(1;Nb) Q1(1;Na)
Q1(1;Na)
; where Na and Nb
are reference values of N . The leading case of changes in N in the data is from no incumbents to monopoly, for which
Na = 0 and Nb = 1: Second, computation of Q1 (1; N) must be in reference to some utility level that incorporates
the mean contributions from Z1 as well as the unobservable 1: I compute the reference utility level as sample average
of the log-odds sales ratio, less the contribution from N; i.e. U = 1
MT
P
m;t
(Hmt   b1Nmt). Normalizing the market
population to P = 1 (it is immaterial for the calculation of percentage changes), I evaluate the marginal e¤ect using
the formula Q1 (1; N) =
exp(1N+U)
1+exp(1N+U)
:
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N Q1
0 ! 1 12.04%
1 ! 2 12.02%
2 ! 3 12.01%
3 ! 4 11.99%
While the percentage increase in ex-fuel sales does decline in N; at the reference utility level
the marginal e¤ect of entry is roughly constant, with an additional ethanol fuel retailer leading to
a 12.0% increase in ex-fuel sales. Thus, the model implies an economically signicant increase in
ex-fuel demand in response to E85 market entry.
The remaining coe¢ cients (1) capture the e¤ects of exogenous market-level observables (Z1) on
consumer ex-fuel vehicle demand. Of these, only gas_stations, ethanol_plants, and auto_dealers
are time-varying. The remaining covariates are time constant, and appear only in the levels
equation of the GMM system. These regressors control for consumer demographics (rural, income,
age, male), commuting patterns (travel_time, interstates), retail vehicle availability (auto_dealers),
and fuel prices (gas_stations, ethanol_plants, corn_acres). Signs of these coe¢ cients generally
conform to prior expectations. For example, ex-fuel sales are higher in markets with fewer gas
stations (high gasoline prices) and more auto dealerships (greater availability of ex-fuel models).
Controls for commuting patterns are insignicant. The demographic variables indicate greater
demand for ex-fuel vehicles in rural, higher income regions.
Turning now to the eet ex-fuel demand estimates, the coe¢ cient on N (21) is also positive
and signicant, implying a positive feedback loop in eet ex-fuel demand and E85 retailer entry.
I compute the marginal e¤ects of E85 retailer entry on eet ex-fuel demand in the same manner
as for the consumer model, and obtain:
N Q
0 ! 1 25.64%
1 ! 2 25.63%
2 ! 3 25.61%
3 ! 4 24.60%
The model predicts a greater demand response by eets to E85 market entry than by consumers.
This result seems intuitive, since many eets operate under alternative fuel use mandates, and are
therefore more likely to utilize E85 than consumers. The coe¢ cient on private access E85 stations
is insignicant after controlling for market xed e¤ects, as anticipated.
The exogenous market characteristics in the eet demand equation (Z2) control for rm charac-
teristics (avg_salary), commuting patterns (interstates), retail vehicle availability (auto_dealers),
and fuel prices (gas_stations, ethanol_plants, corn_acres). The number of car rental agencies
(auto_rentals) is included, since the alternative fuel preferences of these rms (which constitute
the majority of large eets) may di¤er systematically from other types of vehicle eets. The num-
ber of businesses in the market, total_establishments, is a control for systematic di¤erences in the
28
market size denition, which is based on the number of persons employed in the market. In e¤ect,
this controls for the e¤ect of concentration of employment on the potential market size. The
general pattern of these parameter estimates resembles that in the consumer equation. However,
the incomee¤ect is reversed ex-fuel purchase is more likely in markets with lower paying rms.
The rural variable stands out as particularly material, which may reect systematic di¤erences in
eet composition or usage patterns in more agrarian regions.
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Table 5: Main estimation results - ex-fuel vehicle demand
Equation
Consumer Fleet
retail E85 stations (N) 0.114*** 0.229***
(0.029) (0.077)
gas -0.006*** -0.034***
(0.001) (0.003)
reneries 0.032 -0.017
(0.061) (0.069)
dealers 0.006** 0.025***
(0.002) (0.006)
corn -0.008*** -0.058***
(0.002) (0.003)
interstates -0.004 -0.096***
(0.019) (0.024)
rural 0.140*** 1.833***
(0.038) (0.041)
income 0.007***
(0.001)
age 0.006
(0.003)
male 0.027***
(0.006)
commute -0.003
(0.002)
private E85 stations ( eN) 0.236
(0.342)
rentals 0.034
(0.023)
total_stablishments -0.000***
(0.000)
avg_alary -0.007***
(0.002)
Market xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Observations 41292 41292
RMSE 0.80 1.18
Weak id F 48.18 25.05
Overid Chi-squared (dof) 5.72 (2) 4.14 (2)
Overid p-value 0.06 0.13
AR(1) Z 1.685 -1.697
AR(1) p-value 0.092 0.090
Standard errors based on 30 bootstrap replications
Signicance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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6.1.2 Fuel Retailer Entry
The E85 market entry estimates are presented in Table 7. The estimated correlation coe¢ cients
13 and 23 are insignicant. I interpret this result as indicating that the model specication fully
captures the relevant variation through the control variables. Thus, when exploring the robustness
of my results to other assumptions in Appendix D, I use a compuptationally more convenient entry
model estimator that assumes independent shocks to E85 protability and ex-fuel vehicle demand.
Entry model regressors are divided into three categories, corresponding to xed cost shifters
(Z3), variable prot shifters (Z4) and market size shifters (Z5). For xed costs, the primary
controls are state and period xed e¤ects. The rural and income variables are included as xed
cost shifters, under the premise that equipment and labor input prices may vary with these factors.
As one might anticipate, xed costs appear to be higher in more rural, higher income regions. The
negative coe¢ cient on gas_stations presumably reects local economies of scale in servicing the
infrastructure requirements of service stations (e.g., installation of tanks and pumps). Similarly,
ethanol_plants should correlate positively with availability of ethanol-related infrastructure and
installation services. However, this e¤ect is not signicant.
The variable prot shifters include demographics that may correlate with fuel type preferences
(rural, income), fuel consumption patterns (travel_time), competition concentration (land_area),
wholesale ethanol prices (corn_acres, ethanol_plants), and substitute fuel price (gas_stations).
In general, the estimates are as expected prots are higher where wholesale ethanol prices are
low (more corn, ethanol plants), competition is more geographically dispersed (larger area), and
substitute fuel prices are high (fewer gas stations). The demographic factors suggest rural, lower
income ex-fuel vehicle owners are more likely to purchase E85. The fact that variable prots
decrease in income is somewhat counterintuitive, since presumably higher income consumers would
have higher willingness to pay for E85, but income may also capture some type of costs particular
to higher vehicle density regions. The negative coe¢ cient on travel_time is also puzzling, since
long travel times should reect greater fuel consumption. However, another interpretation of this
result is that fuel is purchased with greater probability outside the consumers home market. All
coe¢ cients are statistically signicant.
The market size coe¢ cients are particularly interesting to interpret, as units have been nor-
malized to consumer ex-fuel vehicles. The only exogenous market shifter used in the market
size expression is interstates, which is assumed to capture E85 consumption by ex-fuel vehicles in
long-range commuting patterns. The estimate implies the presence of an interstate highway has
the same contribution to retailer prots as 12:2 consumer ex-fuel vehicles in the installed base.
In a similar fashion, the coe¢ cient on the eet ex-fuel installed base () parameter indicates that
it takes 1=:14 = 7:1 eet ex-fuel vehicles to equal the prot contribution of one consumer ex-fuel
vehicle. That eet vehicles contribute less to retailer prots is somewhat surprising, given that
eets frequently operate under alternative fuel usage mandates while consumers have no such re-
striction. In his study, Corts (2010) nds that it takes about twice as many consumer ex-fuel
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Table 6: E85 market entry thresholds in consumer ex-fuel vehicles
Required installed base
E85 stations Monopoly conditions Average conditions
1 203.6 256.2
2 458.1 576.4
3 814.3 1024.7
4 1272.4 1601.0
vehicles as government eet ex-fuel vehicles to support one E85 station. Both the data and meth-
ods di¤er, so a direct comparison of the results is di¢ cult. In particular, eet vehicles in my study
are predominantly comprised of corporate vehicles, whereas in Corts (2010) eetsare exclusively
government vehicles. It should be noted that my result is not an artifact of the model structure,
as the descriptive regressions in Table 4 show. The e¤ect of the eet installed base on the number
of E85 retailers is smaller (and insignicant), suggesting the di¤erences between the studies relates
to the data. Inasmuch as Corts (2010) uses a cross-section of all current registrations (as opposed
to my time series of vehicle registrations), there may be signicant di¤erences due to the initial
conditions of the eet installed base, which I must model indirectly.
Interpretation of the entry model results is facilitated by computing the number of ex-fuel
vehicles required to support a given number of E85 retailers, or the entry thresholds in the
language of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991). The supply side of the network e¤ect essentially
operates through this mechanism: as the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles increases, the market
becomes more protable to serve, and at certain threshold values of the installed base, additional
entry becomes feasible. I report the entry thresholds reported in Table 6. The threshold values
are computed from the entry model estimates using the formula: SN =
exp( b 0Z4)b0Z5 (N + 1)2 : I
report entry thresholds with respect to average monopoly conditions (i.e., Z4 and Z5 are computer
for observations with N = 1) and for the full sample. The two measures are reported since there
appear to be systematic di¤erences between markets that can support E85 retailers and those which
do not, much of which can be attributed to the state e¤ects in xed costs. Under typical monopoly
conditions, the model predicts that at least 204 consumer ex-fuel vehicles are required to support
a single ethanol fuel retailer. Using the entire sample average increases the monopoly thresholds by
approximately 50 vehicles. These estimates compare very favorably with the observed installed
bases (see Table 3) and the estimates by the Environmental Protection Agency (Department of
Transportation and the Environmental Protection Agency (2002)), which suggest about 200 ex-
fuel vehicles are required. Corts (2010) estimates the required number of consumer ex-fuel vehicles
to support a station to be somewhat higher, in the range of 320 to 560 vehicles.
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Table 7: Main estimation results - E85 market entry
Variable prots ( ) Fixed costs () Market size (; ) Covariance ()
rural 1.662*** 0.595***
(0.114) (0.093)
income -0.014*** 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002)
gas_stations -0.049*** -0.039***
(0.004) (0.006)
ethanol_plants 0.344 -0.259
(0.197) (0.246)
travel_time -0.034***
(0.006)
corn_acres 0.037***
(0.004)
land_area -0.002***
(0.000)
constant -2.338***
(0.190)
eet FFV installed base 0.141**
(0.047)
interstates 12.231**
(1.912)
1 0.033
(0.070)
2 -0.017
(0.138)
State xed e¤ects No Yes No -
Period xed e¤ects No Yes No -
Standard errors based on 30 bootstrap replications
Signicance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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7 Applications and strategic implications
The results presented in the previous section provide strong evidence of an indirect network e¤ect
in the market for ethanol-compatible vehicles and fuel. In this section, I demonstrate application
of the results and discuss the strategic implications for rms. The rst counterfactual experiment
quanties the cumulative e¤ect of positive feedback arising from ex-fuel vehicle demand depen-
dence on E85 availability. This descriptive exercise provides insight into the long-run signicance of
the network e¤ect across a sample of heterogeneous markets, which cannot be easily inferred from
the point estimates of marginal e¤ects calculated in Section 6.1.1. The remaining experiments
evaluate promotional strategies rms may implement to accelerate the adoption of the ethanol fuel
standard, and thereby generate additional demand for their products. In these experiments, I take
the perspective of a ex-fuel vehicle manufacturer and evaluate the e¤ect of o¤ering promotional
subsidies to fuel retailers to enter the E85 market.
To reduce the computational burden of evaluating the counterfactual experiments, I focus on a
random sample of 400 markets in Midwestern states.
7.1 Quantifying the network e¤ect
Feedback in the econometric model is realized through two mechanisms. The rst source of
feedback originates from the simultaneous determination of ex-fuel demand and E85 entry, and
operates within the period outcomes are realized. The demand side of this feedback loop is
compactly summarized by the marginal e¤ects of N on ex-fuel demand computed in Section 6.1.1.
The second source of feedback is the persistence of ex-fuel demand in the installed base, which
operates across periods. Here, I quantify the long-run impact of both e¤ects in sample market
conditions.
The method is to rst simulate market outcomes assuming the model estimates are the true
parameters governing the data generating process (the baseline). Then, the simulation is re-
peated under the assumption that neither consumers nor eets have utility for E85 (i.e. I set
1 = 21 = 0): Simulation of market outcomes requires the following series of steps. First, for
each market observation, I draw market shocks from the distribution (14). Next, I solve the model
for the equilibrium values of Q1; Q2 and N period by period, updating the installed base sequen-
tially. Third, I repeat the rst two steps multiple (30) times and average the result to obtain the
expected value of the market outcomes.
I summarize the counterfactual graphically in Figures (1) and (2) below. In these plots, the
installed bases and number of E85 retailers are aggregated across the sample markets. At any
point in time, the cumulative inuence of the network e¤ect is given by the di¤erence between the
baseline and no-feedback curves. In the nal period (2006), the network e¤ect accounts for 9.4% of
the predicted number of E85 retailers. Similarly, the network e¤ect accounts for 27.5% of the total
ex-fuel vehicle installed base. Indirect network e¤ects of this size are economically material, but
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moderate in comparison to those observed in high-tech product markets.26
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7.2 Subsidy of Ethanol Market Entry
From the marketers perspective, the externalities which characterize an indirect network e¤ect are
a double-edged sword. On the one hand, existing availability of a complementary good increases
demand for the marketers product at no additional expense. On the other, when an important
complement is scarce or unavailable, demand may be severely depressed or curtailed entirely. In
the latter circumstance, neither producer of the complementary good pair wishes to make unilateral
investments in expanding their product availability, since such e¤orts may not be reciprocated. A
solution to this chicken-or-egg problem is to devise co-marketing strategies that internalize the
network e¤ect i.e., contractual obligations that align rm incentives. I assess two arrangements
of this type, in which subsidies are provided by vehicle manufacturers to fuel retailers in order to
encourage E85 market entry. The rst subsidy policy considers the benets and costs of a xed-
rate subsidy that reduces the xed cost of market entry by 10% for all potential entrants in all
time periods. The second policy allows for a variable-rate subsidy, where the subsidy level is set
by the vehicle manufacturer. The subsidy o¤ered equals the amount required to induce one more
entrant than the un-subsidized market equilibrium would support. The subsidy is only o¤ered in
markets where prots from additional vehicle unit sales in the current period exceed the cost of the
subsidy.
26For example, Nair, Chintagunta, and Dubé (2004) nd that indirect network e¤ects in PDA hardware/software
adoption account for 22% of the installed base of PDAs over a period roughly half the length of my study.
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To assess prots in dollar terms, one would need to know the manufacturer margin per ex-fuel
vehicle and the normalization required to scale E85 retailer xed costs into dollar units. Outcomes,
however, only depend on the ratio of these two quantities. I simplify matters by normalizing the
unit of prot to be the average manufacturer margin, and assume a ratio of 1:100 for vehicle margins
to average E85 xed costs. This would be consistent with manufacturer prots of $50 per ex-fuel
vehicle and $5000 average E85 xed costs.27
The subsidy policies are computed in a manner analogous to that described in the previous
section. For the xed-rate subsidy, I evaluate the e¤ect of a 10% reduction in xed costs by
adjusting the xed cost intercept value. For each rm that enters, the vehicle manufacturer is
assessed a subsidy cost of 10%*100 = 10 units. The variable rate, or market optimized, policy
allows for targeting the most protable markets for subsidy. Manufacturers only extend the o¤er
of subsidy to markets for which it is protable and pay the minimum subsidy required to induce
an additional entrant. I evaluate the policy by solving for the change in xed costs required
to induce N + 1 E85 retailers in equilibrium. If this cost (in vehicle units) is smaller than the
incremental ex-fuel unit sales with N+1 E85 retailers, market outcomes corresponding to N+1
ethanol retailers are assigned and the vehicle manufacturer is credited with the resulting net prot.
Otherwise, the net prot is simply the unit sales with N retailers.
Figures (3) to (6) below summarize the e¤ect of these counterfactual policies. Plotted values
are the incremental changes to the quantities of interest from the baseline simulation, which capture
the cumulative e¤ect of the policy. Figures (3) to (5) demonstrate that, relative to the xed rate
policy, the variable rate policy results in 40% higher consumer/eet ex-fuel installed bases in the
nal period, while inducing 6% less E85 market entry. The prot implications of the two policies
are summarized in Figure 6. Over the course of the sample period, actively targeting markets for
subsidies results in a 50% increase in cumulative prots relative to the blanket xed-ratepolicy.
This simple experiment clearly demonstrates that the network e¤ect may be harnessed to improve
vehicle manufacturer protability, and that an optimal incentive policy will incorporate knowledge
of local market conditions.
27Margins on new vehicles sold in the US varies greatly by manufacturer. Japanese automakers lead in
protability with pretax margins in excess of $1200 per vehicle, while the Big Three domestic manufactur-
ers (which produce the bulk of ex-fuel vehicles) typically earn less than $250 per vehicle. For example,
GM actually lost $2500 per domestic vehicle sold in 2005. Source: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060102083.html
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8 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of network e¤ects in the demand for ethanol-compatible vehicles
and retailer entry into the market for ethanol fuel. The network e¤ect arises in this market
due to complementarities in the availability of ethanol fuel and the installed base of ethanol-
compatible vehicles. To measure these e¤ects empirically, I develop a simultaneous equations model
of consumer ex-fuel vehicle demand, eet ex-fuel vehicle demand, and E85 retailer market entry.
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The model extends the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) model of competitive entry to incorporate
an endogenous market size. I develop a new estimator for the model that accommodates the
simultaneity induced by the co-determination of ethanol-compatible vehicle demand and ethanol
fuel supply. correlated shocks to the demand and entry systems, and that does not require the
use of instruments for the entry equation. In contrast to most studies of indirect network e¤ects,
the feedback mechanism investigated here is spatial in nature and operates at a highly localized
level. To identify these highly localized e¤ects, I estimate the model using a panel of zip code level
observations. These data incorporate the entire population of vehicle registrations and ethanol fuel
market entry events in six states over six years. The rich panel structure allows me to control for
unobservables and to correct for simultaneity bias in the vehicle demand estimation by using lagged
endogenous variables as instruments. The model estimates provide strong evidence of a network
e¤ect, with both statistical and economic signicance. Under typical market conditions, entry of
an E85 retailer leads to a 12.0% increase in consumer demand for ex-fuel vehicles and a 27.5%
increase among eets. The entry model predicts that an E85 retailer requires an installed base of at
least 204 ex-fuel vehicles to be protable. I apply the estimates in a series of counterfactual policy
experiments in which I further quantify the network e¤ect and explore strategies to improve ethanol-
compatible vehicle manufacturer protability by leveraging the network e¤ect. I nd market-
optimized subsidies provided by vehicle manufacturers to fuel retailers to be highly e¤ective in
enhancing protability.
There are several possibilities for extensions to the paper. First, the assumption of identical
rms could be relaxed in the entry model. One approach would restrict the set of potential E85
entrants to existing service stations, and to obtain data on those rm characteristics. These data
are currently unavailable, however. Since scale economies in ethanol distribution are likely an
important determinant of observed patterns of entry behavior, incorporating chain e¤ects could
have important implications for estimates of the network e¤ect. This extension will considerably
complicate an already computation-intensive estimation procedure, however, since the identities of
entering rms must be determined in equilibrium. Another extension might consider in greater
depth the alternative fuel vehicle choices of eets, in combination with the decision to build dedi-
cated refueling facilities. A wider array of alternative fuel vehicles are available to eets, including
compressed natural gas (CNG), liqueed natural gas (LNG), propane based fuels. It would be
interesting to consider these fuel types (which are not backwardly compatible with gasoline) in the
context of a multinomial choice model.
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Appendices
A Visualization of ex-fuel installed base and E85 availability
Figure 1: Log installed base of ex-fuel vehicles, 2001
Figure 2: E85 availability (station counts), 2001
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Figure 3: Log installed base of ex-fuel vehicles, 2001
Figure 4: E85 availability (station counts), 2006
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B Derivation of the Entry Equilibrium Constraint
To derive the constraint condition imposing @
N
@N  0; I suppress all subscripts and introduce the
following shorthand notations relating to equations (3) and (5). Let:
H1 = ln

Q1
P1  Q1

= 1N + k1
where : k1 = 
0
1Z1 + 1 + !1 + 1
H2 = ln

Q2
P2  Q2

= 21N + k2
where : k2 = 22 eN + 02Z2 + 2 + !2 + 2
Then the current period consumer and eet ex-fuel sales may be written:
Q1 = P1
exp (1N + k1)
1 + exp (1N + k1)
= P1
exp (H1)
1 + exp (H1)
Q2 = P2
exp (1N + k1)
1 + exp (1N + k1)
= P2
exp (H2)
1 + exp (H2)
Di¤erentiating Q1 with respect to N yields:
@Q1
@N
=
@
@N
P1
exp (1N + k1)
1 + exp (1N + k1)
= 1P1
exp (1N + k1)
(1 + exp (1N + k1))
2 =
1Q1
1 + exp (H1)
Similarly, for Q2 we obtain:
@Q2
@N
=
1Q2
1 + exp (H2)
From equation (11) we have:
@S
@N
=
@
@N
 
(B1 +Q1) +  (B2 +Q2) + 
0Z5

=
@Q1
@N
+ 
@Q2
@N
Using these side calculations and dening V = exp ( 0Z4) > 0, the constraint @
N
@N  0 takes
the form:
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C Alternative ex-fuel demand instruments
In this appendix, I report ex-fuel demand system estimates using a variety of instrumentation
strategies. The intent here is to demonstrate the challenge of nding valid externalinstruments
for identication in my application and to motivate the use of the system GMMprocedure of
Blundell and Bond (1998), which implements a time series identication strategy based on lagged
values of the instrumented variables. Correcting for the endogeneity of E85 market entry in
the ex-fuel demand equations (3) and (5), requires nding variables that shift E85 availability
independently of ex-fuel demand. The primary di¢ culty in nding externalinstruments arises
due to the fact that few data sources can match the richness of variation within zip codes I observe
with the Polk vehicle registration data. One method to address this shortcoming would be to
aggregate the ex-fuel data across time into a single cross-section, and search for time-static zip
code level instruments. However, a cross-sectional approach eliminates the possibility of controlling
for unobserved factors in the zip code that inuence ex-fuel demand, which runs counter to the goal
of identifying highly localized e¤ects (and would severely weaken the credibility of the independent
markets assumption taken during estimation). An additional concern is that many shifters of E85
availability will tend to be correlated with ex-fuel demand through their inuence on E85 prices.
The search for external instruments begins with an inspection of equation (12). The form
of the E85 retailer prot function claries that instruments for N fall into one of three categories:
shifters of market size, shifters of variable prots, or shifters of xed costs (collectively, I refer to
these as prot shifterinstruments). Previous studies of market entry, e.g. Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991), have typically used shifters of market size (such as the market population) as instruments
for N: Care must be taken with this approach in my application, since the market size is dened in
terms of the ex-fuel installed base, which is endogenous through current period vehicle demand.
However, lagged values of the installed bases are predetermined in the current period and therefore
should be valid instruments. In the estimates reported in Tables 9 and 10 below, I designate the
set of instruments comprised by the lagged consumer and eet installed bases of ex-fuel vehicles
as MS.
In my study, the most convincing category of exclusion restrictions would involve shifters of
E85 retailer xed costs. These factors would have the greatest theoretical rationale for proper
exclusion from the vehicle demand equations since xed costs should not inuence E85 prices and
are independent of the market size. To develop a set of xed cost shifters, I reviewed sample
installation costs for E85 infrastructure.28 Inspection of these quotations reveals that the primary
cost components are: (1) ethanol-compliant tanks and pumps, and (2) site preparation services,
including excavation and concrete pouring. I therefore constructed instruments for xed costs
using yearly data on the number of establishments in a zip code engaging in petroleum equipment
wholesaling (NAICS 424720), site preparation contracting (NAICS 238910), and ready-mix concrete
28Available at http://www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/ethanol/cost.html.
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manufacturing (NAICS 327320).29 These data are given the variable names petro_wholesalers,
siteprep_contractors and cement_plants, respectively. I refer to these xed cost instruments as
FC.
Shifters of fuel retailer variable prots are the nal category of potential instruments. Using
variable prot shifters as instruments for N requires the strong assumption that vehicle choices
depend upon E85 availability, but not its price. To see this, note that variable cost factors c
enter equilibrium E85 prices, as shown in equation (9). As a practical matter, an instrument
of this class should have strong explanatory power for N but little inuence on vehicle demand.
Referring to the descriptive regressions in Table 4, the number of ethanol plants in a market is a
promising instrument that meets these criteria. In general, pure ethanol will be less expensive
in markets where a renery is present since transportation costs are lower, and where multiple
reneries are present, competition should further lower E85 input costs. Similarly, the number
of bulk petroleum terminals in a market should inuence the variable cost of E85, since ethanol
and gasoline are typically sold at such locations. I therefore construct a set of instruments, VP,
using the variables ethanol_plants and fuel_terminals. Note that in other model specications,
ethanol_plants appears as a regressor in the demand equations as a control for local ethanol fuel
prices. Since the estimated coe¢ cient for ethanol_plants is uniformly insignicant, excluding it
from the demand equations is not of great concern.
Before evaluating and comparing the results, I consider the anticipated direction of the simul-
taneity bias the instruments seek to correct. A priori, I expect N to be positively correlated with
ex-fuel vehicle demand shocks. Presumably, positive shocks to ex-fuel vehicle demand reect
unobserved market conditions which are also conducive to E85 market entry. In this case, the
coe¢ cients on N in the vehicle demand equations will be biased away from zero since the partial
correlation with the demand shocks will be attributed to the (positive) coe¢ cients on N: In other
words, not correcting for the simultaneity will overstate the network e¤ect in the demand estimates.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility that the reverse relationship holds, i.e., that N could
be negatively correlated with shocks to ex-fuel demand. One plausible scenario is that is an
increase in demand for gasoline, which would lead to higher retail gas prices, would then drive
consumers to buy more ex-fuel vehicles, while fuel retailers would be inclined to abandon selling
E85 in favor of the higher margin gasoline.
Another basis by which estimates may be evaluated is economic plausibility. Theory predicts 1
and 21 should be positive, by presumption of positive feedback cycles in ethanol adoption. The
raw patterns of correlation in the data strongly support this prediction: the descriptive regressions
in Table 4 as well as the uncorrected OLS and rst di¤erence estimates of the structural model
(Tables 9 and 10 below) all predict a positive e¤ect of N on ex-fuel vehicle demand. Thus, negative
estimates of  with high signicance are very suspect. To assess a reasonable upper bound for 1;
I consider its predicted impact on ex-fuel sales at varying levels of N: I compute the predicted
29Available from the Census zip code business patterns (ZBP) database:
http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/zbp_base.html
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percentage increase in consumer ex-fuel sales (Q1) as a function of N relative to N = 0 at various
levels of 1; assuming a baseline utility equal to the sample log-odds ratio:
N n 1 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1
1 5% 10% 22% 64% 170%
2 10% 22% 49% 170% 619%
3 16% 35% 82% 341% 1754%
4 22% 49% 121% 619% 4325%
Table 8: Predicted % increase in consumer ex-fuel sales relative to N = 0 at sample mean utilities
Casual inspection of the above table suggests that a reasonable bound is 1 < 0:5, since vehicle
sales increases in excess of 50% due to entry of an ethanol monopolist seem implausible based on
the observed patterns in the data.
As a comparative baseline, I include OLS regressions and the system GMM estimates with the
IV regressions reported Tables 9 and 10, which respectively contain the consumer and eet demand
models. The rst three OLScolumns show regressions of the ex-fuel log-odds ratios, H1 andH2;
with di¤erent sets of controls. The results demonstrate that in the consumer equation, estimates
of 1 (the coe¢ cient on N) are generally robust across specications, whereas in the eet equation,
controlling for unobserved market heterogeneity is extremely important for estimates of 21 (the
coe¢ cient on N). For both demand models, the OLS estimates of the  coe¢ cients seem plausible
from an economic perspective. Also, as expected, the e¤ect of private ethanol fueling facilities
in the eet demand system becomes insignicant after controlling for market unobservables, since
most of the variation in eN is absorbed by the xed e¤ects. For this reason, obtaining strong
instruments for eN is not a great concern for consistency of the eet demand estimates.
Inspection of Tables 9 and 10 reveals the shortcomings of the prot shifter instruments for
identication: all estimates of 1 and 21 are either statistically insignicant or economically
implausible. A potential solution to the identication problem is to use lagged values of N as
instruments for N: The required assumption is that current ex-fuel vehicle demand does not
depend on past levels of E85 availability. This assumption is a priori reasonable and consistent with
the other assumptions of the model. The systemGMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998),
reported in the nal column of the tables, can use two period or greater lags of N as instruments for
N . To reduce the total instrument count, which can result in overtting the endogenous regressors
(see Windmeijer (2005)), I use two and three period lagged values of N as instruments in the
reported regressions. As seen in Tables 9 and 10, the estimator delivers highly signicant estimates
for 1 and 21. Comparing with the OLS estimates (most appropriately, the third column that
includes market and time xed e¤ects), the correction for endogeneity is the anticipated direction,
although the correctedestimates are statistically consistent with the uninstrumented counterparts
(within 95% condence intervals). I interpret this result as evidence that the controls employed in
the model are su¢ ciently rich to render the residuals purely idiosyncratic. The null hypothesis of
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OLS OLS OLS IV MS IV FC IV VP IV SGMM
e85_retail (N) 0.148*** 0.149*** 0.129*** -9.632*** -0.301 0.906 0.114***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.025) (2.113) (0.306) (0.565) (0.029)
gas_stations 0.021*** 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 0.007** -0.000
(0.001) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
ethanol_plants 0.020 -0.041 0.331 -0.025 -0.004
(0.044) (0.058) (0.337) (0.062) (0.045)
auto_dealers -0.011*** 0.000 -0.036* -0.002 0.003 0.012***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002)
corn_acres -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001)
interstates -0.024** -0.016
(0.008) (0.012)
pop_growth 1.067*** 0.813***
(0.029) (0.050)
rural 0.741*** 0.398***
(0.015) (0.025)
income 0.006*** 0.009***
(0.000) (0.000)
age 0.019*** 0.027***
(0.001) (0.002)
male -0.001 0.010*
(0.002) (0.004)
travel_time -0.011*** -0.004**
(0.001) (0.002)
Zip xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40716 40716 33930 33930 33930 33930 40716
RMSE 0.90 0.80 0.71 1.47 0.71 0.72 0.68
Weak id F 11.02 23.48 5.94 48.59
Over id 2 (dof) 0.01 (1) 39.08 (2) 8.18 (1) 5.72 (2)
Over id p-value 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.06
AR(1) Z 77.174 76.996 4.198 2.730 4.325 3.911 1.685
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.092
Table 9: IV comparison: consumer ex-fuel vehicle demand
no serial autocorrelation in the residuals is not rejected at the 5% level in both the consumer and
eet equations, indicating use of the estimator is valid. The test overidentifying restrictions (H0 :
exclusion restrictions are valid) is also not rejected at the 5% level, suggesting that the lagged values
of N are properly excluded from the ex-fuel demand equation. I also perform the equivalent of
a weak instruments test by testing the joint signicance of lagged values of N in a regression of
demand model controls on N: This is analogous to the Stock and Yogo (2002) test of excluded
instruments reported in the two stage least squares regressions. The large (>>10) value of this F
statistic provides further evidence that the instruments have identifying power. In sum, the system
GMM estimation clearly has the most desirable properties among the available IV estimators, and
I therefore use it to estimate ex-fuel vehicle demand in the main estimation routine.
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OLS OLS OLS IV MS IV FC IV VP IV GMM
e85_retail (N) -0.231*** 0.233*** 0.236*** 1.300 2.852*** 1.352 0.229**
(0.025) (0.028) (0.035) (0.789) (0.584) (0.846) (0.077)
e85_private ( eN) -0.279* 0.586*** -0.095 -0.163 -0.225 -0.165 0.402*
(0.135) (0.131) (0.102) (0.123) (0.156) (0.124) (0.157)
gas_stations -0.035*** -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.033***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
total_establishments -0.067 0.120 0.074 0.015 0.072 -0.021
(0.062) (0.090) (0.106) (0.133) (0.106) (0.079)
ethanol_plants 0.022*** 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.016 0.021***
(0.003) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006)
auto_dealers -0.056*** -0.056***
(0.001) (0.003)
auto_rentals -0.079*** -0.081***
(0.011) (0.021)
avg_salary 1.788*** 1.799***
(0.019) (0.039)
corn_acres 0.105*** 0.032* 0.032* 0.025 0.032* 0.093***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017)
interstates -0.000*** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
rural -0.005*** -0.183*** -0.175*** -0.179*** -0.175*** -0.005**
(0.001) (0.027) (0.028) (0.026) (0.027) (0.002)
Zip xed e¤ects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 40716 40716 33930 33930 33930 33930 40716
RMSE 1.62 1.13 0.86 0.88 0.94 0.88 1.20
Weak id F 12.68 24.41 5.20 48.59
Over id 2 (dof) 14.66 (1) 0.97 (2) 11.16 (1) 4.14 (2)
Over id p-value 0.00 0.61 0.00 0.13
AR(1) Z 100.994 78.258 -2.065 -1.266 -0.805 -1.249 -1.697
AR(1) p-value 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.206 0.421 0.212 0.090
Table 10: IV comparison: eet ex-fuel vehicle demand
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D Robustness results
In this section, I explore the robustness of my results to three key assumptions: the spatial inde-
pendence of markets, the competitive conduct of rms and the denition of the eet market size.
The assumption of Cournot competition only has implications for the entry model, while spatial
independence a¤ects both vehicle demand and ethanol supply estimates. I report these robustness
checks in Tables 13, 14, and 15.
Since the main estimation routine found no evidence of correlated shocks to E85 market entry
and ex-fuel vehicle demand, in Section D.1, I develop an alternative estimator which is compu-
tationally more attractive for testing a wide variety of assumptions. Except as where otherwise
noted, I employ this estimator in all the results reported below.
D.1 Restricted maximum likelihood estimator
I develop an estimator of the E85 entry model under the restriction that 13 = 23 = 0: In this
case, the only source of endogeneity comes from the dependence of Q1 and Q2 on N: Since the
only stochastic dependence here comes through the shock to xed costs 3; the likelihood of N
once again takes the form of an ordered dependent variable, as in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).
Assuming that 3 s N(0; 1); the likelihood of an observation of N can then be expressed as:
Lmt(3jb12; Bmt) = Pr[Nmtjb12; Bmt] = Nmt  N+1mt  (26)
where  () is the standard normal cumulative density function. As in the unrestricted model,
estimation is conditional upon the rst step estimates (b12) and the (unobserved) prior period
installed base. Also as before, the bootstrap procedure will correct for measurement error associated
with using b12 rather than the true 12: Of course, no draws of unobservables are required for this
model, but it is still necessary to integrate the uncertainty in the installed base of ex-fuel vehicles
out of the likelihood function. This step is accomplished by the Monte Carlo integration:
Lmt(3jb12) = EB hLmt(3jb12; Bmt)i (27)
=
1
NS
NSX
s=1
Lmt(3jb12; Bsmt)
Once again, to ensure that a unique equilibrium exists for all observations, I impose the con-
straint that rm prots decline in the number of rms (N); through the use of a penalty function.
Thus, the estimator of 3 solves the constrained maximization:
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b3 = arg max
3
X
m;t
lnLmt(3jb12) (28)
subject to :
@Nmt
@N
 0 8m; t
As Table 11 demonstrates, I nd very close agreement in parameter values from this estimator
and the unrestricted estimator.
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Table 11: Comparison of E85 market entry estimates under i.i.d. and unrestricted shock assump-
tions
Entry, ex-fuel demand error structure: iid unrestricted
Variable prots rural 1.708*** 1.662***
(0.176) (0.114)
income -0.012*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002)
gas_stations -0.061*** -0.049***
(0.005) (0.004)
ethanol_plants 0.353 0.344
(0.204) (0.197)
travel_time -0.032*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.006)
corn_acres 0.029*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.004)
land_area -0.001*** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
constant -2.613*** -2.338***
(0.215) (0.190)
Fixed costs rural 0.588*** 0.595***
(0.085) (0.093)
income 0.008** 0.005*
(0.003) (0.002)
gas_stations -0.027*** -0.039***
(0.005) (0.006)
ethanol_plants 0.443 -0.259
(0.493) (0.246)
State xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Market size eet FFV installed base 0.153** 0.141**
(0.053) (0.047)
interstates 10.411** 12.231**
(3.835) (1.912)
Covariance terms 1 0.033
(0.070)
2 -0.017
(0.138)
Signicance levels: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Standard errors based on 30 bootstrap replications
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D.2 Market indepdence and competitive conduct
To assess the robustness of model estimates to the assumption of market independence, I devise an
ad hoc procedure to limit the inuence of out of market competitors in E85 retailing. Concerns
about the violation of market independence center on the fuel retailer entry model, since the
inclusion of market xed e¤ects largely controls for patterns of spatial dependence in the vehicle
demand system. Following the logic behind Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991), I estimate the model using markets which are geographically isolated from one another, in
the sense that markets with E85 retailers are separated by some minimum distance criteria. As they
study professional industries present in virtually all population centers, Bresnahan and Reiss are
able to construct a large estimation sample using fairly stringent criteria for geographic isolation.
I do not have that luxury, since markets with ethanol retailers are rare (2.7% of observations)
and are geographically clustered. Imposing greater geographic isolation leads to signicant loss in
the number observations, particularly for highly competitive markets, as may be seen in the table
below:
Nearest competitive ethanol market:
Retail E85 stations 5 miles 10 miles 20 miles
0 38,530 35,400 30,659
1 823 597 209
2 80 48 18
3 16 12 1
4 4 3 1
Total 39,453 36,060 30,888
Table 12: Sample sizes under restrictions on out-of-market E85 retailer proximity
I estimate the model using samples which satisfy the 5, 10, and 20 mile separation criteria. The
convergence properties for the 20 mile separation model are poor convergence was achieved for less
than 50% of the bootstrap replications. I therefore discount any inference from this specication,
but it is reported for completeness. Comparing these estimates to the main results, we nd that
estimates are quite robust to the extent to which markets are isolated, and hence independent.
Estimates of the  parameters in the ex-fuel demand equations are highly robust and remain
signicant with E85 station separations of up to 10 miles. Parameters of the E85 entry model
manifest greater variation, but generally remain consistent with 95% condence intervals. The
net e¤ect of the di¤erences in parameter estimates may be seen in the entry threshold estimates.
As intuition might suggest, imposing greater geographic isolation lowers the point estimate of the
monopoly entry threshold (by ~15%).
The Cournot assumption implies that installed bases should increase at a rate proportional to
(1 + N)2: However, casual inspection of cumulative consumer ex-fuel registrations conditional
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upon N (Table 3) suggests that installed bases may increase at a slower rate. Cartel behavior is
an alternative model of competitive conduct that is consistent with a slower rise in the installed
base (linear in N): The cartel model also represents a lower bound for the e¤ect of competition on
ethanol retailer prots. Referencing Table 15 and comparing the cartel model estimates (column
5) to the analogous Cournot model (column 1), we see that all parameter estimates are statistically
equivalent, with the exception of the variable prot intercept. The predicted monopoly threshold
is slightly higher (7.4%) in the cartel model.
Minimum E85 station separation (miles) 0 5 10 20
e85_retail (N) 0.114*** 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.200
(0.018) (0.040) (0.046) (0.124)
gas_stations -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.006**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ethanol_plants 0.032 0.022 0.070 0.036
(0.061) (0.053) (0.072) (0.084)
auto_dealers 0.006** 0.007* 0.008** 0.008*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
corn_acres -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
interstates -0.004 -0.000 -0.004 0.007
(0.019) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017)
rural 0.140*** 0.115** 0.126** 0.116
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.063)
income 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
age 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
male 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027** 0.025**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009)
travel_time -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Zip xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41292 39453 36060 30888
Table 13: Market independence robustness - consumer ex-fuel demand
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Minimum E85 station separation (miles) 0 5 10 20
e85_retail (N) 0.229*** 0.243* 0.239** 0.400*
(0.077) (0.095) (0.085) (0.200)
gas_stations -0.034*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ethanol_plants -0.017 0.018 0.004 -0.050
(0.069) (0.088) (0.086) (0.122)
auto_dealers 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
corn_acres -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.062*** -0.069***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
interstates -0.096*** -0.103*** -0.121*** -0.117***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.031)
rural 1.833*** 1.797*** 1.794*** 1.808***
(0.041) (0.037) (0.044) (0.036)
e85_private ( eN) 0.236 -0.036 -0.278 0.417
(0.342) (0.609) (0.760) (0.910)
auto_rentals 0.034 0.019 0.020 0.034
(0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.027)
total_establishments -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
avg_salary -0.007*** -0.007** -0.007*** -0.008***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Zip xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 41292 39453 36060 30888
Table 14: Market independence robustness - eet ex-fuel demand
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Competition Cournot Cournot Cournot Cournot Cartel
Minimum E85 station separation (miles) 0 5 10 20 0
Variable prots rural 1.662*** 1.755*** 1.865*** 1.858*** 1.580***
(0.114) (0.149) (0.148) (0.331) (0.117)
income -0.014*** -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002)
gas_stations -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.047***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005)
ethanol_plants 0.344 0.379* 0.439* 0.078 0.378*
(0.197) (0.156) (0.179) (0.370) (0.155)
travel_time -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.042*** -0.030* -0.030***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.014) (0.006)
corn_acres 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.038***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
land_area -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
constant -2.338*** -2.383*** -2.163*** -2.425*** -3.803***
(0.190) (0.202) (0.211) (0.337) (0.170)
Fixed costs rural 0.595*** 0.862*** 1.024*** 1.415*** 0.565***
(0.093) (0.094) (0.114) (0.219) (0.104)
income 0.005* 0.003 0.000 -0.007 0.005*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
gas_stations -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.022** -0.030** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007)
ethanol_plants -0.259 -0.227 -0.119 -0.635* -0.192
(0.246) (0.176) (0.256) (0.273) (0.212)
State xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market size eet FFV installed base 0.141** 0.212** 0.290** 0.237* 0.140**
(0.032) (0.070) (0.108) (0.105) (0.043)
interstates 12.231** 12.667* 15.479*** 23.128 15.415***
(1.912) (5.001) (4.441) (20.849) (4.212)
Table 15: Market independence/competition robustness - E85 market entry
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D.3 Fleet market size
Table 16 reports the eet ex-fuel vehicle demand estimates under an alternative denition of mar-
ket size. Instead of using the number of employees as the measure of market size (the structural
column), I dene the market size as the total number of eet purchased vehicles in the market.
This denition of market size implies the dependent variable H2 can be interpreted as an inside
market share I thus refer to this model as the reduced form. Overall, the parameter estimates
compare favorably, although a few coe¢ cients have statistically signicant di¤erences. Impor-
tantly, the coe¢ cient on N is robust. As the two market size denitions di¤er signicantly, the
degree of similarity in the results is reassuring that the market size denition does not have great
inuence on the model estimates.
Market size specication Structural Reduced form
e85_retai l (N) 0.229*** 0.319***
(0.077) (0.067)
gas_stations -0.034*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003)
ethanol_plants -0.017 0.094*
(0.069) (0.048)
auto_dealers 0.025*** -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
corn_acres -0.058*** -0.036***
(0.003) (0.001)
interstates -0.096*** -0.102***
(0.024) (0.014)
rural 1.833*** 1.221***
(0.041) (0.032)
e85_private ( eN) 0.236 0.111
(0.342) (0.442)
auto_rentals 0.034 -0.059**
(0.023) (0.022)
total_establishments -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
avg_salary -0.007*** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.001)
Zip xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Period xed e¤ects Yes Yes
Table 16: Market size robustness - eet ex-fuel vehicle demand
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